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12 September 1979

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No. 2017

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Benefit of Higher Oil Prices Questioned ('Abd-al-Karim al-Khalil; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 30 Jun 79) ...	1
America's Wheat Weapon Against the Oil Situation Discussed (AL-MUSTAQBAL, 30 Jun 79)	4
Palestinian Ambassador Speaks Out on Revolution in Iran (Mani al-Hasan Interview; AL-QABAS, 17, 19, 20, 26 Jul 79)	7

Briefs

Medical Assistance for Yemen	22
------------------------------	----

EGYPT

Conference To Be Held on Role of Foreign Banks (AL-MUSAWWAR, 27 Jul 79)	23
Role, Accomplishments of Military Colleges Noted (Hamdi Lutfi; AL-MUSAWWAR, 27 Jul 79)	25

IRAQ

Parley Discusses Iraqi Leader's Views on Socialist Construction (AL-JUMHURIYAH, 3, 4, 6, 7 Jul 79)	30
--	----

ISRAEL

UNIFIL Seen Ineffective Against PLO (Ze'ev Schiff; HA'ARETZ, 17 Jul 79)	61
--	----

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Iraqi Nuclear Bomb Seen as Most Serious Threat to Israel (MA'ARIV, 23 Jul 79)	66
Labor Party Attacked for Its Stand on National Service Law (Editorial; HAZOFEH, 16 Jul 79)	69
Israel Planning To Vary Types of Imported Oil (Mikhael Garti; HA'ARETZ, 25 Jul 79)	71
Campaign Launched To Expose Israeli Repressive Methods ('Abdallah al-'Atoum; AL-QABAS, 28 Jun 79)	75
Briefs	
Dialog With Palestinians Urged	78
New Settlement	78
Drought Threatens Sea of Galilee	78
JORDAN	
Dr Jamal al-Sha'ir Discusses Proposed Pan-Arab Seminar ('Abdullah al-'Atum; AL-QABAS, 20 Jun 79)	79
Ministry of Agriculture Cites First-Quarter Accomplishments (AL-RA'Y, 21 Jun 79)	86
LEBANON	
Political, Social Situation in South Seen Discouraging (Various sources, various dates)	88
Israeli Involvement With Haddad War Damage, Losses	
QATAR	
Finance Minister Discusses Arab Problem, Oil Policy (AL'URUBA, 21 Jun 79)	95
New American Maneuver Against Palestinians Alleged (AL'URUBA, 26 Jun 79)	98
TUNISIA	
Selective Character of Amnesty of Political Prisoners Criticized (LE MONDE, 5-6 Aug 79)	102

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Reportage on Changes in Electoral Code (Michel Deure; LE MONDE, 2 Aug 79)	104
MUP Disputes Point Made in Previous Article (LE MONDE, 3 Aug 79)	106

BENEFIT OF HIGHER OIL PRICES QUESTIONED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 30 Jun 79 pp 32-33

[Article by 'Abd-al-Karim al-Khalil: "Sincere Advice About Lowering Crude Oil Prices"]

[Text] Can OPEC as an organization, or its member states as individual societies, be hurt more than they are helped by the process of raising oil prices?

The question may seem a little strange.

For by ordinary standards, and by the simple calculations which rely on mere numbers, the very question of whether or not the process of raising crude oil prices can have negative effects of OPEC as an organization and on the life of each of its states may appear odd. But what if the question were to proceed on the assumption that there were losses to offset the gains, and were to aim at discovering whether these hypothetical losses are greater or smaller, more or less important than the benefits and advantages which are achieved.

The simple calculation compels one to believe that an increase in the yields derived from the sale of a given quantity of a commodity or volume of production entails a profit which confirms the benefit of raising prices and precludes any loss from it, or at any rate remains larger than any loss which does occur. But this belief may be a delusion, as is the belief that raising the wages of employees for the same quantity of work involves definite gains which are greater than the losses incurred, if any.

This comparison may be more appropriate here than any other. For when OPEC resorts to employing the principle of compensation for the decrease in purchasing power of its revenues from a barrel of oil as a basic argument for raising the prices of its oil--much like labor unions eager for improvement, or just wanting to maintain their standard of living--it ceases to be strange to pose a question concerning OPEC's gains and losses from raising its prices in the same manner that one would discuss and question the gains and losses of laborers from an increase in the minimum wage.

Of course, an attempt to put together a complete and precise picture of OPEC's gains and losses from each price increase would require an in-depth and detailed study of the positive and negative effects on OPEC as an organization or its member states as societies at the political, economic, commercial, financial and social development levels, whether with regard to their relations with other countries or their own internal development. But studies are not appropriate for a newspaper article, nor within the capability of one individual. Nonetheless, we might be able to perceive--from the facts concerning the OPEC states in general and some Arab states in particular to the course of their political, economic and social development after raising crude oil prices--certain facts which compel us to believe that the losses which redound to these states and the negative effects which they incur on account of an increase in crude oil prices, while they may outweigh or may equal the gains from such an increase, nevertheless, demand that we ask whether it would have been better if these states had not risked increasing their crude oil prices during the October War, and whether it is more appropriate for them now to continue with the same game they have been playing since the early 1970's, like it or not.

For if the economic process--including production, export, marketing and pricing--aims basically at achieving greater independence, development, well-being, progress and cohesiveness for the country which engages in it, was increasing crude oil prices a means to achieve these things, or was it a means to achieve their opposites, though against the intention and will of the states which conducted the process?

Is our political and military independence stronger, more impregnable and more vigorous today than it was before we entered the game of oil and oil prices, or is it weaker and lower in achievement?

Is the development on which millions and billions have been squandered the kind of development which realizes Arab societies' needs for the ingredients of stable well-being and continuous progress, or has it been dissipated above the ground for the oil resources buried below the ground?

Is the inflation which afflicts the Arab oil states and which they have exported through direct transactions and transfers or through transfers of technicians, experts and workers of sister states, whatever their country, a result of the blessing of prosperity and progress, or is it a tumor spreading through the Arab economies in such a manner that we no longer know when and how to get rid of it, or even restore it to reasonable levels?

Is most of the social fragmentation, the spread of corruption and the individual, political and social moral breakdowns within authorities and among individuals, among the leaderships of the regimes and in the ranks of the overt and covert oppositions, an indication that the abundance of oil resources which has put everyone into the game of mutual theft has not brought a blessing to many of the Arab societies so much as an affliction!

Are most of the political, economic, military, social and moral developments which we have witnessed and are still witnessing and which have coincided with the sudden outpouring of oil and oil wealth an indication that this outpouring has led us into a new dark age whose principles, fundamentals and standards hardly compare with those of the first dark age?

Of course, the wrong in this does not lie with crude oil prices or with price differences, but with those who manage--or are supposed to manage--oil and oil wealth. But does not what has happened contain vital proof of the charge or analysis that leads one to believe that the United States of America, which played a big role in the crude oil price game before, during and after the October War, would not have risked this game nor participated in it nor left its property in the hands of the Arabs if it had not been for a prior assessment based on thorough studies that oil assets would founder more than enrich the Arabs?

Within this picture, it is impossible and unallowable to ignore the gains which some states have realized in building some facilities, installing some equipment and laying some foundations for the future.

Likewise, it 's unallowable to ignore the gains which some individuals have made or the "profits" which have made the wealth of some greater than the wealth of their states.

However, a simple look at the great disparity between all the negative political, economic, social and moral effects which have arisen from the outpouring of oil and money and the positive effects of this outpouring is enough to show that the question of whether the losses which have befallen the oil-exporting states (in particular the Arab states) could be considerably greater than the gains they have achieved--and almost more than enough to compel OPEC and the Arab states in particular to create international and economic channels, bases and relations which would enable them to lower prices rather than raise them. [as published]

I beg your pardon. But how can we have faith in regimes and societies which have not learned how to benefit from raising prices of crude oil and from oil wealth to succeed in benefiting from channels for lowering oil prices?

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AMERICA'S WHEAT WEAPON AGAINST THE OIL SITUATION DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 30 Jun 79 p 35

[Article: "Americans Use Wheat Weapon To Confront Oil Weapon"]

[Text] Can the crude-oil-consuming states which export food products in turn use their exports of these food products to pressure and coerce crude oil producers, either by increasing their production and exports, changing their prices, or both?

Some members of the American Congress believe that the states which produce grain, and most of all wheat, can resort to the food weapon to effectively confront the oil weapon. "Because the Arabs raise the price of their oil, then let's use the matter of the grain which they buy as a means of pressure," more than one Congressman has suggested.

The suggestion is tempting in itself. The mere utterance of it is enough to create widespread support among the ranks of voters in the United States, which has begun to see gas stations jammed with long lines of citizens who have been successfully convinced by propaganda that the shortage and higher prices of oil products are a result of the policies of OPEC, and especially the Arabs in OPEC.

But despite the temptations inherent in this weapon, it appears that the possibilities of using it are limited, especially if the oil-exporting states learn how to take advantage of the incompatibilities among different states which produce grains in general and wheat in particular.

The potential for using the food weapon arises from the fact that the OPEC states are dependent on the grain-producing states to insure their needs of wheat and other grains.

The value and true importance of the figures below can be made clear by comparing them with the figures pertaining to the production, supplies and trade of wheat throughout the world. The world production of this strategic commodity is estimated at 440 million tons annually as opposed to 55.5 million tons of stored supplies and a total of 71 million tons traded in world

markets. In the assessment of some international circles, the dependence of most of the OPEC states on the wheat-producing states is not at all trivial, such that the delay of one wheat shipment to certain of these states could create a condition of alarm or fear in the capital of the state concerned.

OPEC States' Wheat Needs (thousands of tons)

<u>State</u>	<u>1978-79 Imports</u>	<u>Est. Deficit in 1990</u>
Kuwait	125	--
Saudi Arabia	725	962
UAE	110	--
Libya	500	723
Algeria	1,600	4,300
Iraq	500	419
Iran	1,500	--
Venezuela	780	--
Nigeria	1,150	--

But this assessment does not prevent its authors from noting that the OPEC states' need for wheat imports as compared to the total amount of wheat traded is not on the same scale as the capitalist industrialized states' consumption of crude oil, which is estimated at 3 billion tons annually. This is much larger than the OPEC states' yearly volume of wheat imports (5.5 million tons) or total grain imports (14 million tons), which actually represent no more than 4.9 percent of the total wheat traded and 8.7 percent of the total grain traded in world markets, the latter of which is 160 million tons per year.

If it is correct that the OPEC states' importation of wheat and other grains involves important figures which relate to each state and its ability to guarantee its needs, then an attempt to prevent these states from obtaining the wheat and grains they need might run up against numerous difficulties in view of their ability to pay cash for what they need and to buy what they need from diverse sources, or even through numerous friendly states. The latter possibility is perfectly clear in view of the proliferation of grain trade channels which it may be impossible to monitor or control.

Some American observers view the effective and successful use of the grain export weapon as potentially very difficult even for the United States of America. This is because any limitation or reduction in exports would be reducing the exports of American farmers, who would face a drop in prices for which the American government might be able to compensate them without

simultaneously insuring the agreement of Canada, Argentina and Australia to similarly limit exports—especially since Canada and Argentina export 50 percent of their wheat production and Australia exports 75 percent--and without also insuring the possibility that some West European states would benefit from such a situation [as published].

The essence of the matter is that while it might be possible to put pressure on the oil-exporting states by employing the principle of "a bushel of wheat in exchange for a barrel of crude oil," this pressure would probably be very weak, especially if the oil states know how to exploit the political, economic, financial and oil incompatibilities among the states which produce and export wheat and other grains.

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PALESTINIAN AMBASSADOR SPEAKS OUT ON REVOLUTION IN IRAN

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 17, 19, 20, 26 Jul 79

[Interview with Hani al-Hasan by Ibrahim Abu Nab: "The Road to Qom: Islam and Contemporary Economic Challenges; Islamic Republic or Denominational Republic; the Iranian Revolution and the Palestinian Revolution and Vice Versa; Palestinian Revolution Will Stand on Its Own Land in Next Four or Five Years"]

[17 Jul 79 pp 1, 18]

[Text] Hani al-Hasan, Abu 'Ammar's political adviser, is the director of the PLO office in Tehran. But he is more than an office director; he is a special ambassador for the Palestinian Revolution in Tehran. The conversation that I had with him must be published before I continue relating what I saw and heard in Tehran. This conversation outlines the subjects that I will later discuss and whose depths I will examine slowly.

[Question] The picture in Iran is contradictory and frightful. Some people are saying that at least 95 percent of the Iranian people support Khomeyni and that only 5 percent, who represent the ultraright and the ultraleft, are against him. But others are saying that the people have become weary of waiting and of instability and that they want something [to happen] quickly. Other people oppose [this statement] and say that they are ready to wait 2 more years in this condition and to give the revolution its chance.

It is obvious that some people are rushing Khomeyni so they can bring about his downfall, and that others are encouraging him to proceed slowly and languidly, implying that the revolution is becoming feeble. It is also clear that if the revolution does not move forward, it will come to a standstill; and if it comes to a standstill, it will become rigid and regress. The dangers of foreign intervention and also the dangers of internal division exist. What is your opinion of this picture?

[Answer] I believe that the Iranian Revolution will not regress. The principal value of the Iranian Revolution lay in the fact that it did away with dictatorship which is expressed through tyranny. Dictatorship is a social system and it is also an ideological system. It has its culture, its economy and, ultimately,

its politics. It is certain that the ideology of a dictatorship as well as its economic system and its policy will not return to Iran because the Shah committed errors that established a deep hatred of dictatorship in the hearts of the Iranian people.

The only group that still supports the Shah is that which was tied to the Shah's economy. This group has now been destroyed. During this stage of transition, therefore, the Iranian regime finds itself now suffering from a major economic crisis inside the country that is caused by the flight of the dictator's class. The substitute for this class is not another one that will take over the economic system; the substitute rather is a new economic system.

And now at this stage we are feeling this problem in Iran, such as the appointment of a new cadre. There are many qualified people, but the problem is how a new cadre with new values can be established? At present, this is the problem of the Iranian Revolution.

[Question] How can this problem of establishing a new system with its new cadres and its new laws be overcome?

[Answer] Iran had to pursue one of two courses in order to make rapid strides: it could proclaim a state of emergency for 1, 2 or 3 years so as to gain control of things and rearrange them; it would then shift to a nonemergency, Islamic, parliamentary state.

Ayatollah Khomeyni rejected this course, and the reason for this--and this is my own personal analysis--was the hatred for dictatorship. The Iranian Revolution is similar to the French Revolution, which did create in France values that were based on justice, equality and freedom. So far, France has not been able to rid itself of these three slogans. The French Communist Party even found itself compelled to renounce the dictatorship of the proletariat because the party could not exist in France if it continued to adhere to the dictatorship of one class over another. One of the reasons for this matter, as Jarudi has been trying to explain, lies not only in the class mode of the intellectuals, but rather in the fact that the "historicity" of modern France does encompass [the notions of] "freedom, justice and equality." Accordingly, whoever is not committed to these three notions, cannot enter into the sphere of contention in French society.

Hatred of dictatorship in Iranian society will become the principal component of the Iranian character in the coming period.

[Question] What do you mean when you say the Iranian people? Do you mean all the ethnic groups that live in Iran, including the Kurds and the Arabs?

[Answer] I mean all the Iranian people, including the Kurds and the Arabs. These people will not be able to subject themselves to dictatorships because these people in particular have suffered more than others from dictatorship. And this is one of the reasons why they are taking quick action.

[Question] Are these same values, which these people have, factors that attract them to Iran or factors that pull them away from it in their longing for freedom, justice and equality for themselves as independent ethnic groups?

[Answer] There is no doubt that Kurds or Arabs in Iran have strong feelings of patriotism. This is what I have sensed in my direct conversations with many of these leaders.

But the problems in Iran are not one-sided only; they have other aspects. Even when one talks to Imam Khomeyni about the Arabs' areas, and especially about Khuzestan, he appears to find [such subjects] painful. He has said more than once that that area in particular had suffered the most kinds of injustice during the Shah's administration. Hence comes this action in the Kurds' and the Arabs' areas; the speed of such action springs primarily from anti-dictatorship values.

Naturally, everything has its opposite. When one opposes dictatorship, one stands in line [with those] who are calling for other values, and the other values of the Iranian society are awaiting the ideological interpretation of Islam. As you know there is a philosophical aspect and a scientific aspect to everything. There is a philosophy of economics, and there is a science of economics; there is a philosophy of sociology and a science of sociology; Islam in Iran is now facing a major test: it is awaiting the conversion of philosophy by intellectuals into a science that embraces all subjects.

When we study the Holy Koran, for example, we find that it includes a philosophy of general economics, and we find the full details of a science of economics for a commercial community that is limited in size. But we do not find in the Koran the science of an industrial society and the economics of major cities.

[Question] Does this require the independent judgment and the discovery that are based on general philosophy?

[Answer] Yes. Take, for example, a bank that operates without [charging] interest. The rejection of interest in the past was a rejection of a certain kind of interest. Today, however, interest or what is known as bank interest has assumed different dimensions. Accordingly, when a non-interest bank was established in Qom, [officials] had lengthy debates among themselves about how they would organize matters. It is for this reason that letters were sent to a number of Islamic figures in the world who are working in this field so that they would let Iranian officials know [the answers] from their experiences. In the next few days studies that were made about [such] experiments are due, and these will be presented to the Iranians.

This is the major challenge: will Islam offer an economic system that is neither capitalist nor communist, or will there be in Iran a new capitalist system with a new name?

[So long] until tomorrow.

[19 Jul 79 pp 1, 18]

[Text] [Question] Dr Tehrani told me that all the people would be willing to give up their lives to the Islamic Revolution if they were asked to do so. But the problem is that they do not know how to deal with the problems of the day in accordance with the new regime. They need time to learn; is there time?

[Answer] There is a difference of opinion now in Iran about time and the importance of time. Qom wants [to pursue] the fastest methods for adopting the constitution so that it can get to the fastest methods for forming an Islamic government and setting up a legislative authority. Qom wants the legislative process and the implementation of laws to be carried out in a non-dictatorial manner. But there is another view which finds that precipitating the question of the constitution involves the danger of adopting a constitution that has not been considered. The matter has now been settled in favor of establishing a council of experts and not a constitutional council in the well-known sense of the term. The constitution is to be adopted in the next 2 or 3 months, and a parliament is to be elected so that a new government can be formed.

[Question] There is a difference of opinion here. Intellectuals and party moderates are saying that a constitutional council and not a council of experts must be established to adopt the constitution. They are saying that a council of experts method smacks of dictatorship. Accordingly, they are accusing Khomeyni who is resisting dictatorship of attempting to impose a new dictatorship.

[Answer] But those people are forgetting that planning [efforts] in Qom proved to be very astute. At the outset people were asked to vote on the name of the republic. Qom rejected everything but the specific wording of the Islamic Republic in Iran. It turned down the name, the Islamic Democratic Republic, or any other name so as to make it clear to everyone that it wanted to draw up a constitution that was 100 percent Islamic. Qom thus did obtain in advance a mandate from the people. Accordingly, the insistence on having a council of experts stems from the fact that there would be no independent judgment on the matter any longer. The people did agree to the Islamic character of the constitution, and the Council of Experts was to be asked to debate whether this article or the other was or was not consistent with Islam.

[Question] There is another point. The authors of the constitution have insisted on including an article stating that the state religion was Islam and that its doctrine was that of the Twelver Ja'fari Shi'ite Sect. It is this that made the Kurds dissatisfied with the constitution. On the other hand, Qom is now stating that we must focus on Islam [in general] and not on one sect to the exclusion of another. Imam Khomeyni has asked that the debate over the succession [between proponents of] the Commander of the Faithful, 'Ali, and the opponents cease. Instructions have been issued to the Shi'ites

to focus on Islam and not on defending the Shi'ite Sect. But there is a contradiction between what they are saying and what is taking place in the draft constitution.

[Answer] This argument about this subject is actually going on among the Islamic forces. It is a very important point, which, I am convinced, will determine the vital sphere for Islam which is centered in Iran. Will Islam be brought to life with an infantile disease that would prevent it from having a major, vital field, or will it be brought to life with a smaller perspective? Therefore, we will see how this matter will be settled.

An idea was proposed to the Islamic Council that was held in London regarding the necessity of convening an Islamic round-table debate in Tehran to discuss these questions with Moslem intellectuals in Iran. Ayatollah Montazeri holds an opinion in this regard; he is asking that [the principles of the] different denominations and not only those of the al-Ja'fari Sect be taught in Qom. But there are other men of the cloth who are extremists on this question. It is inevitable that there be a process of classification in the future within the Moslem ranks so that the conservative and the close-minded may be distinguished from the internationalists. We will discover from this experiment which trend will be victorious.

[Question] The experiment is an Islamic one. But there are other forces, such as the leftist forces and those of the national right, for example, who are not given enough time by this experiment to make a decision. This fact may now be coming to light prematurely.

[Answer] Naturally, these forces are now featured prominently for two reasons. First, some leftist forces, such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq and the Feda'i-ye Khalq, played an important role in rejecting dictatorship. They fought against dictatorship and, consequently, they did establish their presence on the Khomeyni lay in the fact that it did not leave a single Iranian neutral. All Iranians are participating [in the revolution]. Therefore, the number of principal organizations that were active on the scene grew because everyone who had been neutral brought his neutrality to an end and joined an existing party or formed a party with others. There are now 83 parties that we know of which have had contact with us in one way or another. The explanation for this is not the weakness of the Islamic Movement, but it is rather the fact that the people have expressed themselves by organizing [themselves]. But in my opinion the principal mainstay [of the Iranian Revolution] has not weakened. Since it has assumed power, however, it has now begun to be on its guard. Forces of opposition on the scene have not played any role to impede the growth of the state; but they did play the role of the critic. Everybody is watching: will Imam Khomeyni write a book on the state and the revolution just as Lenin did when he wrote his book about the state and the revolution, thereby establishing his theory on taking over power?

Imam Khomeyni is insisting on the democracy of the take-over; this is not, of course, an absolute democracy, but rather the democracy of the victor. At the same time, we find that Lenin's book on the state and the revolution insists

upon the destruction of the other class because it is a class and not only because it had sided with the czar. [The destruction of the other class is advocated] on the basis of one class taking over power from several classes and subjugating them. The dictatorial, proletarian approach is evident here.

But Khomeyni's state and revolution are rejecting the word, dictatorship, even though there is another Islamic movement advocating the dictatorship of the take-over. Khomeyni himself, however, rejects this approach. I believe that if Imam Khomeyni can in the long run continue in the command by himself without coming to a compromise with the other Islamic forces, he will provide a good experiment [in Islamic government] because the other forces on the Islamic scene are forces of contention and not forces of progress.

Hence we find that the rejection of dictatorship is reflected on an existence on the scene, and, accordingly, on numerous negative factors during the stage of transition. It is these negative factors that the Iranian left is talking about. But what ultimately remains is the economic program that will be proposed after power is taken over in a democratic way.

[Question] Who is preparing all these programs? Khomeyni is only one man, and he cannot undertake all these burdens. He surely must have a support staff.

[Answer] Of course. Khomeyni is an institution. Beni-Sader, for example, chairs an important committee for economic reflection; Ayatollah Motaheri, who lost his life, was a major loss to Imam Khomeyni. He used to chair an important advisory group. There is the Islamic Republican Party which includes Bihishti, Khamin'i and Banhar; they make up an important advisory group on questions of foreign and domestic policy. There is no doubt that Khomeyni has an organization, but the problem is where to begin!

[Question] Then when we talk about Khomeyni, we are not talking about Khomeyni alone, are we?

[Answer] Of course. The greatness of this man lies in the fact that had he been an individualist, he would not have been able to forge this revolution. Khomeyni was able to do what nobody else in the Arab region was able to do. He brought the simple people and all the people out into the streets.

[Question] I heard about the utilization of the cassette tape in the revolution. It demonstrates very careful organization when on the same day hundreds of thousands of cassette tapes with Khomeyni's instructions and slogans would be distributed while Khomeyni himself was still in al-Najaf or in Paris.

[Answer] The significance of the cassette tape and of the fact that Khomeyni played this major role lay in the fact that he did not address the intellectuals only, but that he rather addressed all the people. The cassette tape is the instrument for anyone who cannot read and write. In addition, it is a device that is easier to distribute. But, as I understand it, the principal feature of the cassette tape is the fact that it is intended for the masses and not

the privileged. It is by this means that Khomeyni said, "I will show you how blood defeats the sword in Iran!" Blood here refers to the magnitude of sacrifice. Accordingly, Iran offered an experiment that invalidated scores of Marxist pronouncements about, for example, the process of making a revolution. One of the most important of these theories is that of the elite and of the small, armed, vanguard that leads the masses to overthrow dictatorship. Some said that it would be the workers who would do this, and some said that it would be the farmers who would do it. Khomeyni came along and made the unarmed, large masses offer [their] blood to defeat the sword. It is in this sense that the cassette tape played its role: it addressed every individual and brought to an end the alienation which is imposed on any people by a dictatorship.

[So long] until tomorrow.

[20 Jul 79 pp 1, 18]

[Text] [Question] In view of your experience here and what you have witnessed, what can the Palestinian Revolution learn from the Iranian Revolution? Or did the Iranian Revolution learn anything from the Palestinian Revolution? What I mean is how do you interact with each other?

[Answer] There is no doubt that everything affects the other. It was the Nasirist ideology, for example, that nurtured and gave birth to the Palestinian Revolution. The views of Syria constituted a mainstay for the Nasirist Revolution in opposition to Israel. It gave the Palestinian Revolution land, and the revolution was able to cross the Palestinian border by using the gun, whereas the Ba'th (Party) was not able to do so. They complement one another. There is no doubt that the fact that the Palestinian Revolution has held out for 14 years against challenges from the Americans and from Israel has encouraged many forces about the possibility of holding out against these forces. It has turned Lebanon into a battlefield where hundreds of liberation movements have been trained, educated and immunized before returning to their countries.

But now the Iranian Revolution has had an overwhelming success. As I said in a statement I made on the anniversary of the awaited Mahdi, hundreds of Iranians used to come to us for training, and they would then go back [to their homeland]. But today, the small population of Palestine needs the great Iran because Iran can offer much to liberation movements in the world. In Islamic terms, Iran can offer much to the oppressed [of the world]. This is the substitute term for the notion of the proletariat. The term, "the oppressed," which is an Islamic expression of the kinds of struggle that are ongoing, will become prominent. There is no doubt that the Iranian Revolution has provided an Oriental with an experiment that is clearer than that of Vietnam, for example. Ho Chi Minh was not able to mobilize the man in the street. The significance of the Iranian experiment lies in the fact that it is an Oriental, Islamic experiment and that it is drawn from the nature of the area. It mobilized the man in the street by appealing to the nature of the area and not to a new theory.

[Question] Don't you think that the Iranian Revolution is a continuation of the Islamic Movement that has been in the area for centuries?

[Answer] Of course, and the Arab homeland, therefore, from the gulf to the ocean, has experienced this movement. I do not believe that there is anyone in the Arab homeland who does not sit down and consider his future in the light of this movement. This is because Arab society has lived through a stage of major ideological weakness. It began to look for this ideological weakness, and it turned towards Marxism. But we all know that Marxist thought was not widely accepted among the popular classes.

Nationalism is important and cannot be eradicated, but in the final analysis, nationalism is not an ideology, but rather an identity and a bond. It is not a theory in economics or a theory of society. It is a catchall for ideology. It is for this reason that Arab society is experiencing change. The Iranian Revolution rushed into this change ideologically, and the Palestinian Revolution rushed into it politically.

We in Fatah believe that ideology can only grow out of political struggle. The political goal begets the ideology anew.

[Question] I have heard the opposite to this matter from Tajrani when he talked about the Palestinian Revolution. They are saying that they established the ideology first and then fought afterwards and not the reverse [and that] it was for this reason that they had a lengthy preparation.

[Answer] If our revolution were a social one, this would be true; but when we talk about a national liberation revolution, such words are not true. We must always read a book from its beginning to its end and not from its end to its beginning. When one brings about a social revolution, one is practicing an ideology. This means that one wants to overthrow an economic system and to substitute another; [it means that] one wants to establish new values in the society instead of old ones. Consequently, one reflects on every step [one takes]. During a stage of national liberation, the social question is postponed and, consequently, one's objective is to unify the people and not to solve an economic problem. We in Fatah have thus sorted matters out, and we proposed a regional struggle within the pan-Arab context. Why did we propose this theory in 1963? Because if we had called for a pan-Arab struggle as the foundation [of our ideology] and denied the regional struggle, the functions of national liberation would have become entangled with those of the social revolution. One cannot draw up a plan then. We proposed a regional struggle so that every problem could be sorted out separately, provided that it be within the pan-Arab context whose goal is liberation. A Palestinian does not confuse social questions with the stage of liberation. What social identity is the Association of Workers of Palestine, for example, calling for? It has no land and, accordingly, all its decisions are political since it cannot make a specific decision because the working class in any country is part of the working class in that country.

One of the reasons for the advantage which Fatah achieved is that instead of leaving the Palestinian masses lost as they had been--that is, debating the management of analysis--it drew them into a debate on the results of the analysis. The plan was obvious during the national liberation stage. But when the Palestinian was responsible for Syria, he lost track of his thoughts as he looked for an analysis tool that gave him no results.

[Question] This means that the Palestinian Revolution will continue indefinitely. [It means that] it is the common denominator between the revolution in Qatar, the national revolution, the Islamic Revolution and the international revolution. Isn't that so?

[Answer] Of course, because we are the drawing force by virtue of the location and the question. The Palestinian Revolution is the drawing force that leads to Arab unity. The ideology that will ultimately prevail will be that which mobilizes the Arab homeland.

[Question] Sometimes other people have a mistaken view of the Palestinians on the basis of this situation. Some see them as subservient to the Soviet Union; others see them as subservient to Syria; others see them as subservient to Iraq, for example; and others may see them as subservient to Islamic Iran because they do not understand this theory. Western newspapers, for example, consider the PLO, East Germany and Cuba to be agents of the Soviet Union and working on its behalf.

[Answer] As long as we are in a stage of national liberation, the nature of the revolution is determined by the forces that oppose it and those that fashion it. Since the United States is our mortal enemy that shows no mercy in killing and attacking the Palestinian people, the opponents of the United States become essentially our allies. Although we differ with the Soviet Union on many matters, the Soviet Union is ultimately a friend of the Palestinian people because the Soviet Union does not kill the Palestinian people; the Soviet Union supports and endorses the Palestinian people.

But if we were to sit and discuss ideological matters, we will find that many Palestinians have ideological differences with the Soviet Union.

To be continued.

[26 Jul 79 pp 1, 18]

[Text] [Question] It is evident that the Arab masses have not yet accepted Marxist thought as their own. I have understood how the Palestinian Revolution under the leadership of Fatah views the nature of its role vis-a-vis the different revolutions and ideologies. It deals with them on its own terms without making a commitment to any one of their ideologies. The Palestinian Revolution is leaving the door open to the ideology that will ultimately prevail in the Arab homeland. But there is no doubt that the Palestinian Revolution will find itself in a critical position when the proponents of the different ideologies

request that it reveal to each one of them whether it supports their ideology or opposes it. [This will be the case] especially when these ideologies come in conflict with each other. Iraq, for example, will tell you that much, if it has not done so already. I have heard some intellectuals of the Islamic Revolution advising the Palestinian Revolution to commit itself to an Islamic liberation ideology lest people other than the Palestinians reap the fruits of the struggle. The communists may be entertaining the same thoughts. What negative or positive effects does this have on the Palestinian Revolution?

[Answer] The Palestinian Revolution itself does not always categorize those it supports, but it does categorize those who support it. The Palestinian Revolution is eternally opposed to Zionism; whoever opposes Zionism will always be on its side regardless of the ideological reasons or the interests he may have for his opposition to Zionism. This [principle] applies not only to the revolutionary forces, but it also applies to everyone.

Iran is 100 percent anti-Zionist; the Soviet Union is anti-Zionist, but it has its point of view on Israel; and the Arab countries are anti-Zionist and oppose the existence of Israel. Accordingly, they definitely constitute the common denominator [in this question]. We are not the ones who would be allotted to them.

We in Patah have found an explanation for the agents of action in the area; we have rejected the strategic illusion which Arab nationalists entertain, but which is not found in nationalism. We have rejected the ideological illusion entertained by the Arab Marxists and not found in Marxism. We have stated that the principal agent of action now is not the class struggle, but rather the struggle with imperialism.

We have asked what concrete imperialism was, and we did reply that it was [manifest in] the military bases. [We asked] what the most important military base in the area was, [and we replied] that it was Israel. Accordingly, whoever wants to fight the United States in the area has to fight Israel. The Shah of Iran tried to build a military base in the area for the United States. That was his destiny. When the Iranian people rose up in rebellion against the Shah, they were rebelling against that military base. Practically speaking, the Iranian people did not oppose the Soviet Union; they were opposing the United States.

Zionism in Israel is no longer a threat to us; it has threatened us and finished with us. Zionism is a threat to everyone in the area. It is a threat to Syria, to Iraq and to Iran. In the future it will be a threat to Turkey if Turkey expels the Zionists who are now controlling the textile industry. Taking a position against Zionism is not the place for a charitable organization. It is the place of one who recognizes the threat Zionism poses to him and decides, [therefore], to oppose it.

The Iranian-Palestinian alliance is not based on ideological principles, but it may be spurred by an ideology. The common interests [Palestinians and

Iranians] have in the defeat of Zionism so that the area can be liberated and so that we may rid ourselves of America's tool in the area constitute the principal bond in this regard.

[Question] This explains to some extent the kind of relationship that exists between the Palestinian Revolution and the Iranian Revolution. It seems to me that there is some similarity in the mode of thought of the two revolutions. The Iranians are saying that freedom from Americans must not signify embracing the Soviets. [They are also saying] that freedom from the Soviets does not mean embracing the Americans. This is a new mode [of action] for the Third World: it is one of self-reliance via Islam, as was the case in Iran; or it is one of reliance on a national ideology that is similarly profound. The Palestinian Revolution also wants to preserve its freedom. This does not mean that it become a pawn to any particular country or ideology. The Palestinian Revolution allies itself with all those who are against the common goal [sic].

I imagine that this theory is one that strategic thinkers or those who are capable of theorizing can comprehend. But what about the simple people and especially the Palestinians who are being asked to fight for a long period of time and who have daily requirements for life and livelihood? They do not know exactly when liberation will come about. Some of them say it will happen in our generation. How do they deal with the daily problems that are created by this kind of struggle? Shouldn't the Palestinian Revolution, for example, offer them something to help them in the long struggle? Or is this not possible?

[Answer] Like what, for example?

[Question] What I mean is that there are daily questions which are very urgent. The revolution has complicated some of these questions for Palestinians living in the Arab countries and abroad. Such questions are those of mobility, travel papers, residence, employment, living and education. Some Palestinians, or [rather] most of them, are encountering major difficulties and problems that they must solve on their own. The identity given to the Palestinian by the revolution has altered the view people had of him prior to the revolution. In many places the Palestinian is seen as a source of danger and the subject of suspicion, and he is being closely watched and beset by actions. The Palestinians are fought and pursued [everywhere].

[Answer] After 1948 the Palestinian was persecuted so that he would not present a threat. Accordingly, we went through the first stage of persecution which was also accompanied by contempt. Today the Palestinian is persecuted because he is feared; he is used to exert pressure on the revolution so it would negotiate. But I believe that in the next few years the Palestinian people will stand on the land. A person who has no land has no dignity. Problems cannot be solved unless we return to the land. After 14 years of struggle we can say with pride that in 1948 we used to walk out [of gatherings], and the Israelis used to walk in. But today, the Israelis are walking out [of the gatherings], and the Palestinians are beginning to walk in.

[Question] What do you mean by this?

[Answer] I mean at international gatherings, for example. When the Israelis entered the United Nations, we walked out; and there was no way for us to enter. Today, we go into every international organization, and they leave or are asked to leave. Not even the United States can prevent the entry of the Palestinian people in international labor, trade-union and student associations. In Europe now, the Israelis have begun protesting our entry [into organizations]. There is no doubt that we and Israel are antithetical: wherever a Palestinian goes, he ultimately makes Israel recoil.

If we go soon into Nicaragua--and this was before the departure of Somoza--this would mean that we have begun to enter into Latin America.

It was in the occupied land that Golda Meir used to say that there were no Palestinians. Today, and even in the Camp David Accords, [the Israelis] are forced to talk about giving the Palestinians autonomy. It is a discussion about offering the Palestinians [something] and not taking it away from them.

[Question] Discussion about such offers is in itself another way of talking about surrender.

[Answer] This is true, but it is also a discussion about an attempt to offer the Palestinians something, even though we are turning it down. [The Israelis] have been forced to discuss offering us something. All of this is characteristic of the stage of regenerating the Palestinian people so that they may stand on their land.

I am convinced that in the next 4 or 5 years the revolution which began aimlessly on a cloud as a refugee revolution will find land to stand on. Accordingly, dignity and respect will be restored to every Palestinian who is being persecuted now, and a new stage of the struggle will begin.

[Question] Are you trying to say that the confrontation with Zionism is broader than a confrontation over the land of Palestine itself, and that it is a confrontation that is taking place in various effective ways and in different areas of the world and that the escalation is continuing?

It seems to me--in fact, I can swear to it--that the Palestinian question did play a role even in the oil crisis that took place in the world. After the October War the price of oil quadrupled. Because the United States and Europe were slow in perceiving and recognizing the truth, the question of oil has come to what it is today. They helped aggravate the situation in the Middle East by establishing Israel. They sowed the wind and they are now reaping the storms. There may be more storms if this question is not solved. What do you think about this?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the question of Palestine did play a principal role in the oil crisis which has come to this [critical] point in the industrial

world. But it is the industrial world that has brought this crisis upon itself because of the position it took to establish Israel and banish the Palestinian people.

[Question] How is the Palestinian Revolution benefiting from the oil weapon and can it help in its use?

[Answer] There is no doubt that oil is not a regional question. Today, oil is a national question which involves destiny. Because of their social conditions and their small populations many of the oil countries will find the Palestinian to be the best soldier to protect these areas in the future. The Palestinian military is daily proving its worth. It serves the entire Arab homeland. Wherever he may be the Arab citizen will not allow oil to remain outside the battle.

Chou En-lai told me once during the six meetings that I had with him, "You are the only ones who have a nuclear weapon that can be used."

[Question] Did he mean you, the Arabs?

[Answer] Yes, the Arabs. There is no doubt that the time has come to an end when this national weapon was a mere commodity because today, after the course al-Sadat has taken, every Arab citizen is facing a question of destiny. This is the question: do you accept or do you reject in the area the onset of an Israeli age which may bring upon you again an age of slavery? Rejecting [an Israeli age] means many things. It means using the oil weapon; it means holding out in South Lebanon; and it means continuing the armed struggle. Rejecting [an Israeli age] briefly means also that no one would be allowed to remain outside the circle of rejection or accept surrender. One is either with slavery or with freedom. Whoever chooses the road to slavery is in Israel's camp. This is characteristic of the current stage: one is either with Palestine or with Israel. There is no neutral [position]. Those who sided with Israel found themselves against Palestine; and those who assumed or tried to assume a neutral position, found themselves involuntarily with Israel.

[Question] One of the men of the Islamic Revolution in Iran told me that if the Americans were to interfere in the Arab oil fields, they would be committing a fatal error because this would precipitate the unity of the Islamic community against them.

[Answer] I personally believe that the Americans are bluffing on the matter of military intervention because there is something that they must know. They used to believe in the fable of the bird and the snake according to which no sooner would the snake stare at the bird, than the bird would be paralyzed with fear, and the snake would devour it.

The Americans must know that the Arab bird is now aware of this game and is no longer immobilized simply because the snake moves. The Arab bird knows that he can foil the snake with a small jump. In spite of the snake's poisons and its dangers, [the Arab bird knows] he can fly.

The oil that is available serves the world more than it serves the Arab citizen. If, therefore, the Americans play games with the matter of oil, they will be the losers and not us. They are hinting at intervention.

Americans believe that they will land in Muscat and Oman. This is the game. The Americans dallied with some Gulf countries, but Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad quickly explained to them that the time [for such dalliance] was over. He played an important and an intelligent role in the elimination of this idea. Sultan Qabus in the Sultanate of Oman is saying that the United States should not abandon its friends, but he forgets that the United States has no friends and that it has interests instead. He forgets that the United States itself is floundering domestically because even in politics there are values or a modicum of values that cannot be ignored. Any country that does not establish sound values for its policy collapses internally.

If the Americans try to intervene in the area, they will be inflicting harm upon themselves. But U. S. intervention is Israeli intervention. It is this intervention that has been in existence for 30 years. And it is this intervention that is more dangerous. We must keep our vigilance focused on this intervention because any other action is worthless.

At any rate what happened in Iran does also constitute a change in the map of the area. I believe that what will happen in Turkey will be another change. I believe that the countdown for the elimination of Israel has begun. The process may require a relatively long period of time, but there is no doubt that the end of this century will comprise major changes. Among these changes is that Israel will not be there, and the problem in the area will be the Jewish condition and not the state of Israel. This is not a dream. There are material facts leading up to this: the growth in the Arab condition; the fall of imperialism in the area outside Israel; the domestic inconsistencies in Israeli society; a major decline in immigration; and the success of the Palestinians in developing the position of the socialist countries. In 1948 the socialist countries had one position; but then 'Abd-al-Nasir came along and pushed it forward towards the Arabs. Today, it is the socialist countries that are involved with the Palestinians and not the reverse. When we went to Moscow for the first time after 1973, the only person who would agree to receive Yasir 'Arafat was the chairman of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. But today and after 6 years we find that the discussion concerns the hours of the visit [to ensure] that President Brezhnev can make the meeting. We now disagree about the kinds of weapons that are to be offered, and we call the Soviets to account for their position on SALT II regarding words and deeds and whether or not their language should have been harsher. All this was [the result] of the shift of a major bloc known as the Socialist Bloc which became attracted to the Palestinian question to the degree that anti-Zionist books are now abounding in the Soviet Union.

This is a new strategic situation now.

[Question] I can carry out this conversation with you till tomorrow morning, but I do not want to wear you out. Is there something you wish to add to all that you have mentioned?

[Answer] I believe that this kind of dialogue is important and beneficial. At the present time I am working on a book entitled "Fatah Will Be Victorious" because I believe that the Palestinian condition is also standing at a cross-roads. [The Palestinian Revolution] may make a decision that in the long run may have [either] negative or positive effects. This means that the Palestinian Revolution will go forward. But will this decision that will be made be beneficial in the long run? In other words, will [the Israelis] succeed in making us take something now that will prolong [the process of] attaining an adjustment, or...?

[Question] Or what?

[Answer] In other words Lebanon took something in 1945 instead of a charter. Thirty years later, however, Lebanon was destroyed even though it did have some prosperous years.

Palestinian diplomacy has been splendid in using up the bait without getting caught by the hook. We have not so far been caught by the hook. We have made mistakes here and there. We have made mistakes in calculating the balances of power. But we have not yet made a nationally strategic mistake. But I do fear making such an error in the coming stage. I fear making this mistake in the midst of a prescribed offensive operation that would be materially victorious. But man has learned that the large and far-away picture is the one which is more important.

At this point I came to the end of my interview with Mr Hani al-Hasan.

[So long] until tomorrow.

1592
CIO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR YEMEN--The Revolutionary Command Council leadership decided to grant therapeutic and medical services to patients from the Yemen Arab Republic in the Qatar institutes of health, free of charge. A responsible source in the Ministry of Health said that this decision gives some body to the 17 July Revolution national direction, and reinforces the pronouncements of the Unified Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in giving all services to the Arab brethren. He added that this decision will provide the Arab brethren in the Yemen Arab Republic the opportunity to get treatment in the health institutes of Qatar free of charge, especially in the rare medical fields such as heart surgery, blood vessel surgery, x-ray clinics, nuclear medicine, and neurological surgery. He mentioned that the council's leadership had issued a similar decree previously, which called for medical treatment for Bahraini patients in the Iraqi health institutes, free of charge. He also mentioned that Iraq and the Yemen Arab Republic had signed a joint convention for health cooperation the first of last month which provides for the setting up of a joint prevention and treatment policy, (so that Yemen could) benefit from the Iraqi expertise in the fields of combating contagious and indigenous diseases, and in the protection of the environment, and to exchange information and experts in this regard. The convention also provides for granting students of the medical and health professions in the brotherly region of Yemen the opportunity to benefit from the expertise which the Iraqi health institutes posses in the field of medical and health education, and to create a unity of purpose and organization in the field of the manufacture of drugs, serums, and vaccines, and to exchange visits to study the developments in the branches of the medical and health fields in Qatar. [Text] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH 29 Jul 79 p 2]

9418

CSO: 4802

CONFERENCE TO BE HELD ON ROLE OF FOREIGN BANKS

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 27 Jul 79 p 26

[Article: "The First Conference on Assessing the Role of Foreign Banks"]

(Text) Dr Hamid al-Sayih and Jamal al-Nazir define the role of foreign banks with respect to the projects of the development plan.

A study of the taxation situation, the legal difficulties and the complaints of banks operating in Egypt.

What have the 70 foreign banks and investment companies offered so far in the way of services to the Egyptian economy?

Under the economic open door policy, despite the short number of years it has been in effect, foreign banks have rushed to open branches, new banks in partnership with the public sector, banks founded by Egyptians with foreign capital, or agent offices of foreign banks. Numerous finance companies have also opened in the vicinity of these banks to engage in financing activity. The number of these various sorts of banks and finance companies has so far reached more than 70--banks and investment companies--which freely engage in their activities in Egypt.

These banks have had some difficulties, many of which have been soluble; but they still have some difficulties.

These banks have had some grievances, some of which it has been possible to allay; but some still remain. There have been two kinds of grievances:

The complaint by the foreign investment companies themselves against these banks since these banks charge high rates of interest and charge high rates for banking services in general.

The complaint by the state, repeated by the responsible agencies more than once, because of these banks' lack of enthusiasm for participating in Egyptian development projects.

A complaint by the Egyptian Central Bank that because of its lack of control over these banks, savings deposited with them are redeposited abroad, causing a shortage of available foreign currency.

Because of all of this, Jamal al-Nazir, minister of state for economic cooperation, and in his capacity as supervisor of the investment organization, called for a conference to include all of these banks and finance companies, the sessions of which will be opened by Dr Hamid al-Sayih, minister of economy, foreign trade and economic cooperation.

As a prelude to this conference which will be held at the end of next month, the investment organization has written to each of the banks and financial institutions to find out about their grievances and difficulties, and to classify and categorize them and make the necessary decisions.

Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Aw dallah, the economic consultant in the Investment Organization, announced that he would submit to the conference a group of papers and studies dealing with three distinct issues:

1. The role of these banks with respect to the economic development plan and the need for their participation in the projects which they consider appropriate for them.
2. The tax situation of these banks.
3. The legal status of these banks, and the difficulties arising from this status.

Jamal al-Nazir, minister of state for economic cooperation, explained the importance of this conference, which he will carefully attend to in order to assess the position of these banks and investment companies for the purpose of defining their role in the economic development and implementing a portion of the plan's projects.

Jamal al-Nazir also said that this specific conference is a precursor to setting up a number of similar conferences which will include a specific sector each time to ascertain the difficulties and devise appropriate solutions so that each one knows its limits and status, and the whole march towards a creative burst in economic building and activity can begin to achieve affluence for our society in the era of peace.

9123
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ROLE, ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MILITARY COLLEGES NOTED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 27 Jul 79 pp 8-10

[Article by Hamdi Lutfi: "On the 27th Anniversary of the July Revolution: The Supreme Commander at Five Egyptian Military Forts; An Important Military Week for the New Young Egyptian Soldiers and Military Experts"]

[Text] Last week had important meaning for Egyptian military science, which has been associated with exalted human accomplishment.

Throughout last week AL-MUSAWWAR accompanied Gen Kamal Hasan 'Ali, supreme commander of the armed forces, as he observed the classes of new soldiers and experts who graduated from our military academies and colleges imbued with the knowledge and skills of the extraordinary scientific development which has governed the military education programs in our country and which has offered the highest forms of scientific interconnection among Egyptian universities and military colleges.

Among the graduates of the War College to which the supreme commander went was the largest class of African brethren, Africa's new defenders who bring the treasures of modern Egyptian military science to their homelands.

Systems of military education have developed in our country--in theory, doctrine and application--based on scientific principles of Egyptian innovation on the basis of modern Egyptian strategy.

Last week was an important week, shining with the new young military vanguard of citizens who during the second week of July 1979 graduated from the military academies and colleges.

A young military vanguard is the new blood which surges in the arteries of the Egyptian armed forces, bearing advanced military knowledge together with high competence arising from the ideal application of the principle of weapons diversification.

The application of military science and tactics in modern armies is not at all a simple matter, because it involves people and equipment. In our armed forces, since the preparation for the Glorious October-Ramadan War, the emphasis has been on training based on the principle that man is not the prisoner of machinery or military equipment, but rather he is its master, and winning victory must begin in men's hearts.

In 1974 life sang with courage and pride in the nature and mettle of the Egyptian soldier, with his unique will and his sense of leadership and strength of character, while the world's newspapers and magazines spoke of the huge technological gap which the Egyptian soldier overcame during the October war. With audacity and backward weapons he demolished the Israeli theory of security lines and the myth of the--until then--unvanquishable Israeli army. An American magazine, TIME, said at that time that with the "surprise" which they carried out in the October War the Egyptian armed forces put the most advanced equipment for warning, espionage and photography--all of which are modern electronic equipment in the possession of America and Israel--into the museum of [military] history.

It was natural after that for the planners among the commanders of the branches of our armed forces to get together to devise plans to develop our land, air and sea forces. First and foremost was the need to develop military education in our country, which each year extends the possibilities and capabilities of the forces with the new blood which flows in the arteries of its body.

Through a strategy governed by the most precise calculations, we have applied the plan at its various scientific levels in the various academies and colleges. The actual beginning of the development and the building of the new stock of superior human resources capable of catching up to the age and firmly establishing the basis of advanced Egyptian technology has always been at the level of mobilization and strategy.

At the Air Defense College

I was told by Professor of Air Defense Maj Gen Ahmad 'Abd-al-Khaliq Jum'ah, commander of the Air Defense College, the most modern Egyptian military college which was founded in 1974 as the practical embodiment of the combat heroism of the soldiers who downed Israeli aircraft in the Glorious October War:

"The purpose of establishing this college was to graduate a special kind of officer who can operate air defense equipment which is constantly undergoing new development. It is equipment of great technical complexity inasmuch as the circumstances of operating it during the Ramadan War necessitated huge numbers of engineers to maintain its combat capability and perform maintenance and technical repairs on it. This is because it was the equipment of the most recent battles.

"Beginning in November 1978 we established a 4-year course of study at the college during which 80 percent of the curriculum of the engineering colleges must be completed in addition to military science and administrative science. The school of engineering at the University of Alexandria has generously agreed to teach this curriculum at the Air Defense College during the 4 years on the condition that following his graduation as an officer in the armed forces the student will complete these studies by pursuing the curriculum of the 5th year. The graduate will thereby complete the entire curriculum of the college of engineering at the University of Alexandria.

"The committee of the engineering sector has recommended presenting the subject to the Higher Council for the Universities so that it may certify the equivalence of the 5-year baccalaureate in engineering studies for the Air Defense College with the [ordinary] baccalaureate of the School of Engineering.

"The Air Defense College has included students from the sister nations of Somalia, Kuwait and the Sudan."

The Elements of Naval Warfare

This week a new class graduated from the Higher Institute for Naval Studies, having acquired the specialized elements of naval warfare and the master's degree in military science. The institute was one of the projects implemented after the Glorious October/Ramadan War and its experiences in the unique battles into which our naval forces entered. Among them was the first naval battle of the modern era. The Egyptian naval forces introduced this new naval military science as an equivalent of the higher military studies received by the soldiers of the land and air forces from the active officers.

They study the most modern systems of scientific administration and systems of naval tactics at advanced levels, and the tactics of the land and air forces also, considering the fact that the modern battle is a battle in which many of the same weapons are used by the different branches. Study is accompanied by practical applications in the joint naval-land military theater. They have actually carried out an offense project at one of our naval bases and a defense project at another base, and they have participated in a tactical military competition which was the climax of the study.

The naval forces have developed courses of study at the Naval College--which is not the Higher Naval Institute, naturally--which has made it necessary to develop specialized instruction for active naval officers. Today we can say with full confidence that Egyptian higher naval studies are equal to those in America, Russia and England. In addition there is study in the important sciences connected with military science, such as economics, political science and various languages." (quotation marks as published)

Science, Engineering and the Technical College

The Military Technical College was the last round in the tour taken by the supreme commander during the week of military graduation, where a new class of alumni graduated, which, for the first time, included military engineers who specialized in installations. In a short time another class, which includes architects, will graduate.

At a meeting with one of the leading experts in the scientific capability of our armed forces, Maj Gen Eng Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid Shawqi, the commander of this college, and his deputy, another expert in the scientific vanguard of the leadership through which the Egyptian armed forces are made to shine, Maj Gen Eng Dr Midhat Mustafa, one of the founders of this college in 1958. I learned that the teaching organization at the college had become completely Egyptianized 2 years ago. It had previously been dependent to some extent on Czech experts during the period of the Marxist ascendancy over the country's destiny, especially from the mid-1960's to 1972.

I was told by the two Egyptian military experts that diversifying the sources of arms has been a special philosophy which must be understood, because some weapon might perform well in a specific military theater but will not achieve this level of performance in another theater because of differences in environment, terrain and climate. Therefore the college must create a level of human competence with the capability of understanding, comprehension and superior practical application.

The fighter planes with their spare parts have a specific useful lifespan, as well as a maintenance and repair plan. This lifespan has been determined by the production schedules of their factories in our country. Probably to a great degree we use this aircraft in a different way, not in accordance with the technical specifications of their manufacture. We must tailor them to our requirements but also lengthen their lifespan. This is what actually happened in our military theaters.

The technical college made high-level calculations in increasing the range of the aircraft and in building additional fuel tanks on them to make the aircraft capable of superior performance. Aircraft is but one example. Technological development, innovation and invention have taken place in other weapons systems such as radar, guided missiles, laser applications, aspects of nighttime observation, navigational equipment, computers, tanks, artillery and chemical and electronic warfare.

The Technical Military College has had a world-wide electronics center since 1975 which serves all of our armed forces. Students at the college also work with it. They are a generation of Egyptian geniuses--young in age, but intellectual giants. At this center classes have been held in research in military operations by modern means and modern science. The active officer must remain receptive to new developments and capable of implementing them through uninterrupted study and teaching in spheres of research, specialization and the basic sciences.

This year a not insignificant number of our officers obtained higher degrees from the technical military college in electronics, pollution [sic], technological skills, missiles, aircraft, operations research and so forth. Indications are that next year the number of our learned officers and their areas of research will increase.

Officers of the training organization at the august college have participated in the largest and most important international conferences. They have presented seven research papers in America, five in Japan, and three in Spain, as well as in England and Belgium.

All of the more than 18 research papers were received with particular esteem for their high standards. An international conference was held in Japan recently. An Egyptian officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel representing the Technical Military College was invited to chair the first session of the conference as a sign of the esteem in which the erudition and knowledge contained in his research in advance physics was held.

The military expert and engineer, Maj Gen Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid Shawqi, the gifted lofty human intellectual fortress and commander of the college told me:

"My happiness is boundless when I know that low-ranking officer alumni stand in France, England and America in the same rank with the giants and professors of military science in those countries and their major universities of international repute. Whenever they collaborate in joint studies the Western professors have only glowing praise for the thinking of these young Egyptians and their scientific abilities which transcend our current age."

Thus the days go by. The wheel of progress continually turns in noble Egypt.

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PARLEY DISCUSSES IRAQI LEADER'S VIEWS ON SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 3, 4, 6, 7 Jul 79 p 6

[Transcript of a panel discussion sponsored by AL-JUMHURIYAH: "The Panel Discussion of AL-JUMHURIYAH Over Comrade Saddam Husayn's Themes About Socialist Construction"]

[Text] (In an effort to broaden the climate of nationalist-socialist thought and grasp the particularistic features of the thought and practice of Ba'thist socialism, AL-JUMHURIYAH's Studies and Research Department organized a panel discussion at Al-Jamahir House to debate the themes proposed by comrade Saddam Husayn about socialist construction. Participants in the discussion included Dr Wamid 'Umar Nazmi, Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Dubaysi, Dr 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar, Dr Riyad 'Aziz Hadi and Tahir al-Bayati. AL-JUMHURIYAH's editorial staff was represented by Sahib Husayn, Dr Muhammad 'Abdullah al-Duri and Dr Muhammad Jasim al-Musawi.)

PART ONE

AL-JUMHURIYAH: We are pleased to welcome you and value your participation, together with the Studies and Research Department, in this symposium, which draws its importance from the profound and vital contents and analyses of comrade Saddam Husayn's themes about socialist construction. The themes incorporate socialist thought and application in our country, which is led by the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. The promotion of socialist awareness among the masses who have a vested interest in socialist construction is a basic and central task designed to insure the success of programs geared toward socialist construction. We hope, therefore, that this parley will contribute to that objective and will generate a climate of serious and committed discussion of the themes of socialist construction. We also hope that it would deepen the revolutionary course of the party's pioneering and type-setting experiment which is essentially aimed at restructuring man, society and the state in accordance with the nationalist-socialist theory of the Ba'th Party.

Ba'thist socialism is a scientific one because it rests on certain objective facts which assert themselves in the Arab homeland because they spring in turn from the conditions prevalent in the Arab homeland--conditions bred by anti-imperialism and the struggle against imperialist domination and the exploitative classes in society. And so when we broach this subject for discussion, we should first emphasize the interconnection between nationalist struggle and socialist struggle against imperialism, Zionism and the domineering forces which have a vested interest in continued exploitation, occupation and imperialist domination. This particularistic commitment in the party's principles to the cause of socialism in the Arab homeland, aided by a host of other facts which are related to our Arab homeland's realities, aspirations and heritage, can serve as a point of departure in our discussion, and it is our hope that the discussion will be enriched with serious thought and strong reasoning.

'Abd al-Razzaq al-Dubaysi: I believe that we should begin by examining certain points. For example, we should define socialism. Socialism aims at serving the masses, especially the toiling masses. As a system, it attempts to eliminate and end class distinctions in society in a manner that would bring about a welfare society. This is a simplified definition of socialism. There are several phases in socialism, beginning with nationalization or the acquisition of the means of production, especially the strategic ones, then moving on to a comprehensive survey of the economic resources so as to insure a streamlined pace of development in the various sectors. There is a basic dilemma on which socialist and capitalists alike have differed, namely, the distribution of income: how to distribute income among the various classes and how to put an end to class distinctions in income distribution.

As the property of the Arab nation, the Ba'th Party's experiment distinguishes itself by its ability to undertake a scientific analysis of the problems of Arab society and to link class and nationalist struggles together on the premise that they complement each other. The particularistic character of this revolutionary movement was reinforced by its rejection of all forms of scientific capitulation. The sixth pan-Arab congress of 1963 took a clear position on this issue by rejecting all forms of ready-made and imported ideological molds. The insistence of the Ba'th Party to attach itself in heart and soul to the realities of Arab society and the party's ability to analyze the problems of society have made the economic and social researcher aware of the uniqueness and particularism of socialist application and practice in the theory of the Ba'th Party as an expression of the aspirations and ethos of the Arab nation.

Dr 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar: As long as we are engaged in scientific analysis and in providing background information about the subject whose main points you have just clarified, it would probably be useful to go back and look at the subject in retrospect with an eye to arriving at general

conclusions about the concept of socialism. Briefly, we could go back to economic history to explore the reason for the emergence of the socialist system as an alternative to capitalism in any given system, especially in the European economic systems. The economic problem exists in all societies, agricultural or industrial, and has existed in all the successive civilizations of man. Usually, it is the same problem in all its occurrences, but its workings and functions, which determine the methods of dealing with it, differ on the whole. Those functions determine the alternative approaches and systems. If we look at the economic problem in terms of the quantity of goods and services produced by the society to satisfy its needs and execute the decisions agreed upon, we will find that a society would distribute the sum of its goods and services and try to preserve its current production by expanding its production in the future through what is called the process of accumulation. We would also find that the functions inherent in the economic problem in terms of labor and orientation differ from one system to another. If we were to study the history of economics since the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution, especially in the 19th century, we would find several weak points which constitute main avenues that led to the collapse of the capitalist system and the emergence of the alternative to that system. The first problem pertains to the lack of programming and planning, which led in turn to a concentration in capitals and monopolies. This inevitably leads to disequilibrium in the distribution of incomes and wealth. The result in such a society is mismanagement of productive resources, because those resources are not properly channeled in line with a given strategy and for the fulfilment of given goals. Instead, resources are employed in accordance with private and special interests and for the satisfaction of the demands of those who can spend on certain products and the realization of private profits. In other words, resources under the capitalist system tend to concentrate on a certain type of production, whereas a different kind of production which is highly in demand because it is related to the basic livelihood of the social group is ignored. The trade cycle is also a major defect and shortcoming inherent in the capitalist system. Another defect resides in the imbalance in the balance of payments and the inability to redress the imbalance automatically. One other problem which the capitalist system has failed to tackle is the development problem. Growth can occur through the accumulation of technical know-how and the producer's capital in its various forms, and although this leads to growth rates that may be high, the kind and content of those rates might be commensurate with the hopes and aspirations and may fulfill the needs of certain classes. As to the question of earmarking certain percentages of income for the purpose of continuous maintenance of the national wealth, providing more goods and services, satisfying increased consumption and bringing about a greater degree of economic and social welfare within a certain perspective that takes into account certain goals, as I have pointed out, this is something the capitalist system has been unable to achieve.

We reject capitalism because it is in the service of a minority, not the society, and we espouse socialism because it is the system which is capable of insuring the welfare of the masses. The socialist system has attended to the questions of development not in the quantitative sense only, but also in the qualitative one, and not just on the limited, single-country level, but also on a national scale. Socialist development then is a regional one with national dimensions, and represents an escalation in the level of welfare for the masses.

AL-JUMHURIYA: It is useful to go into the factors which have made the selection of socialism imperative, because of the failure of the capitalist system to absorb the needs and problems of society and to respond to them. We in the Arab homeland have no other choice but the path of socialism. This is something dictated by scientific reasoning and by the nature, circumstances and development level of the Arab society. But while we are dealing with the other aspects of socialism, we have to point out that the Ba'thist theory believes that socialism is a full-fledged social-cultural-political system and that it not only solves the material problems of the Arab society but also its social, cultural, economic and other problems as well. We hope that the other aspects of socialism will be dealt with so that we may arrive at a characterization of the nature of socialism in which the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party believes and the theoretical characteristics of socialism.

Dr Wamid 'Umar Nazmi: The alternative of socialism in the Arab homeland is an imperative choice, because we are conscious of the special conditions of our homeland. In advanced, capitalist Europe--particularly in Western Europe--the democratic bourgeois, or democratic national, revolution took place in specific historical circumstances under the leadership of a rising social class at that time, namely, the bourgeois class. There is no doubt that the struggle of bourgeoisie against feudalism and backward societies was a revolutionary step in the history of mankind, for that bourgeoisie accomplished the advanced industrial society, brought about the national unity of the European peoples, introduced modern industrialization, the emancipation of women and the blossoming of democratic freedoms. It is certain, however, that this was not accomplished by the bourgeoisie on its own, but was also the fruit of a large contribution by the masses of workers and toilers in the fight for those accomplishments. The Third World situation takes on a broader aspect, for when we face the problem of development and its needs and the task of modernizing society and eliminating feudalism to build the great nationalist [pan-Arab] state and stand up to imperialism and Zionism, we find that Arab bourgeoisie is historically incapable of commanding this process. First of all, Arab bourgeoisie is weak and, secondly, it is umbilically connected with feudalism and the popular masses [sic]. We must also note the characteristics of the socialist experiments. In the Soviet Union, People's China and others, it is noted that these states have not gone through the phase of capitalist accumulation similar to that accomplished by European bourgeoisie as a basic

condition for industrialization and modernization. It must be pointed out too that it is impossible to imagine that such a thing can be done in this time and age and under the present circumstances, for as a result of the global victory of socialist concepts, the workers and peasants cannot allow the accumulation of capital at their own expense but would inevitably impose a socialist accumulation.

The Western development method would also necessarily predispose us to the selection of other methods and other social forces, namely, the toiling masses. This brings me to the point made by one of the brethren here that our socialism is a national one, or that it is enmeshed in the class struggle, and I find it necessary here to point out too that capital in the world is no longer local capital (i.e. European, American or Japanese, etc.) but that it has developed into imperialism, that is the domination of other peoples in an attempt to forcibly open their markets to the consumer goods manufactured in the West, import their raw materials at cheap cost incommensurate with world trade development and export capital to them in order to double their excessive profits. Capital then has taken the form of imperialism, and so struggle against imperialism will have to take on a national character. The broadest masses of the people (and not necessarily just the workers) look forward to the establishment of a society which would liberate them from imperialism and propel them along the path of the great national revolution. Broad sectors of the masses oppose colonialism and Zionism and oppose the colonialist acts of plundering and piracy (especially with regard to Arab wealth and expertise). Therefore, it is necessary to involve those masses in the socialist struggle while keeping the leadership of that struggle in the hands of a vanguard command which is enlightened and capable of utilizing all the people's energies. This is a general characteristic which can probably apply to all the countries of Asia and Africa, prominently the Arab homeland.

There is, however, another characteristic which is indicative of the Arab homeland in particular, namely, the interconnection between socialism and Arab unity. No rational economist can say that small and limited societies are capable of bringing about development, industrialization and modernization in any way. For development, industrialization and modernization require what economists call economies of scale, that is economies which provide a large degree of expertise, vast manpower resources and large numbers of consumers to develop the process of growth and insure a thriving industrial activity. In view of this, I perceive that socialism in the Arab homeland in particular, or even development per se, is closely connected with the process of Arab unity. The faster we move along the road of unity, the more we can say that the cause of socialism has been advanced by the same degree. Therefore, I can say that there is a socialist particularism in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and a socialism particularism in the case of the Arab nation in itself. This, however, does not preclude the existence of general laws which organize and regulate socialist struggle and its various avenues for the peoples of the world in general.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: We must add that Ba'thist socialism constitutes a complete view of Arab society, with its external and internal problems. According to the party's philosophy, Ba'thist socialism is connected with the Arab national existence and consequently with Arab unity.

Dr Riyad 'Aziz: I would like to say in comment that socialism is a fore-gone conclusion, either in the countries of the Third World or in the Arab homeland. This is so for two reasons. The first is that the countries of the Third World, including the Arab homeland, because of underdevelopment and the legacies of the colonialist era, cannot move on to better conditions without a system that can produce qualitative leaps. The socialist framework is the most ideal for such leaps. The second is that the question of selecting capitalism has been pre-determined, capitalism--as a concept and practice--has been associated with the colonialist process in the countries of the Third World, and capitalism, on the other hand, began since the turn of the century to suffer and undergo serious crises in the countries in which it was born.

Events show that the capitalist system has recorded only slight increases in production in those countries, and one can imagine what the case would be in underdeveloped countries which need better tools to be able to make any progress. I would like to return here to the scientific question--the scientific nature of socialism. In my view, scientific socialism understands the course of evolution in society, the characteristics of that evolution and the forces which influence it and is, therefore, equipped to produce the answers and contribute to the treatment of society. This is where the practicality of the party's socialist beliefs derives from. The party has analyzed the realities of the Arab society in a practical manner, grasped its economic and social conditions and prescribed the solutions. Inherent in this process is maintenance of the independent nature of the revolutionary Arab idea, especially efforts to steer it away from chauvinistic currents, non-socialist nationalistic ideas, liberal concepts and non-revolutionary reformist views. In addition, the party believes that the Arab nation's path to socialism is a special, particularistic one. This is natural, as comrade Saddam Husayn says. The fact that both the theory and solutions are produced within the national and pan-Arab society will make them qualitatively more advanced than the usual conditions and circumstances. This involves an attachment to the past combined with an effort to improve the future. Naturally, the socialist experiment in Iraq which translates the thought of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party on the practical level since the 17-30 July revolution rests on the Arab nation's belief in its right to select its socialist course and framework and in the manner which would enable it to apply socialism in its scientific, well-studied framework as well as its pan-Arab framework. The application of socialism can be true only when the characteristics of pan-Arabism, the contradictions which serve the exploiting class and all the forms of internal and external exploitation are taken into account. The

party's rejection of ready-made axioms derives, as I have mentioned, from the party's rejection of ready-made frameworks and ideologies which are not the produce of the scientific analysis of the phase in question. The adoption of a scientific socialism derives from the party's rejection of the process of ideological transplantation or borrowing, on the principle that the act of borrowing would deprive the borrower of originality and of an important condition of progress and development, because borrowing introduces formulas and actions which are isolated from the national liberation movement due to the fact that they are imported mechanically, as comrade Saddam Husayn says. Originality not only gives a nation its identity and independent personality, but also gives socialism a clear scientific character. I wish to affirm that there are other aspects to socialism, socialism, including the humanistic aspect which springs from the party's view of socialism as a complete philosophy of life and its belief that socialism is not a matter of economic solutions and approaches but is a process intimately linked with the humanistic conditions of society.

Tahir al-Bayati: I will deal with two points. The first is the scientific aspect of the Ba'th Party's socialism, which was partly discussed by Dr Riyad. The second point is the relationship between nationalism and socialism in the eyes of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. We know that the Ba'th Party advocates socialism as one of the means of resurrecting the Arab nation and one of the bases of its comprehensive view. Accordingly, we feel that Ba'thist socialism is different from other socialisms because it derives its foundations from a reality which is different than the reality in which other socialist systems have grown. Ba'thist socialism is a scientific one because it is a response to the struggle of the Arab nation--a struggle against colonialism and imperialism--and a natural response to the aspirations of the Arab nation, that is aspirations to a future of abundance. In that sense, Ba'thist socialism is both scientific and moralistic. Marxist socialism has affirmed that accumulation in the capitalist system comes from one source--the surplus of value created by the working class. We believe that accumulation in the capitalist system is not created by the working class only. True, the working class contributes to a part of the surplus of value, but the plundering of the Third World is a bigger source of the accumulation process under the capitalist system. The plundering of the Third World is the basis of the development of that system and the factor which provides that system with vast opportunities and an economic base that enables it to acquire political strength and to impose many things that are inconsistent with the interests of helpless peoples. There are other points of difference between our system and Marxism, such as that the bourgeois class which owns industry in the capitalist system is the party which is in conflict with the working class, or that it is the basis of the strife in the capitalist system, whereas imperialism and the exploitative monopolies allied to reaction are in conflict basically with the Arab nation. Ba'thist socialism does not merely seek to return wealth or the ownership of wealth to society or to distribute that wealth, as the

Marxist theory provides, but seeks to liberate wealth from the control of imperialism and colonialism and their exploitative allies and to bring about collective ownership in order to serve society. The third point is that the Ba'thist socialism has certain features and characteristics drawn from the reality of this nation. This means that Ba'thist socialism, which is a complete theory and an experiment which has linked theory and practice together, can be a basis for the solution of the problems of the Third World or a path which the Third World can follow in order to build an ideal society free of colonialist domination. As to the relationship between nationalism and socialism in the ideology of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, we are all aware of the party's experience in the field of developing the socialist course and deepening the organic relationship between unity, freedom and socialism with all the basic historical factors involving our destiny which this process entails in the theoretical and practical realms.

PART TWO

Dr 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar: It is clear that man is the aim of development and socialism as well as the effective tool of development and socialism for the attainment of a high civilizational standard and their tool as well for the service of mankind. Our topic of discussion, however, is not concerned only with the material aspect of life, but also with man. Socialist development involves social, cultural and economic aims, that is the formation of a capable and aware man. Our discussion is also concerned with technical aspects which contribute to man's knowledge and to the prospects of applying science to the various aspects of life. And so socialism is concerned with all aspects of life, including the psychological aspects, and with the formation of a sound and productive person who can contribute with his fellow men to the development of the productive process and elevate the level of his efficiency in order to increase accumulation and prosperity and serve mankind.

'Abd al-Razzaq al-Dubaysi: To confirm what Dr 'Abd al-Wahhab has just said about man being the aim of the plans of development in Iraq, the revolution's outlook was a sweeping one when it passed many laws, whether laws providing for free education or for the eradication of illiteracy. The central aim of all such legislation was to enable man to develop mentally so that he can develop economically. Contemporary studies, especially those conducted in advanced countries, demonstrate that education plays a major role in the human development as well as the development of the national economy. The process of educating man and providing him with the means which would enable him to operate a machine technically and capably has increased economic growth by 60 percent. Capital or investment has not managed to contribute more than 20 percent in the process of economic development in any country. The other contribution came from technology and technical development. I wish to refer here to the talk made by comrade Saddam Husayn at a

meeting of the Planning Council (1977) about the question of the role of the socialist sector, especially that aspect relating to economic development in the rural areas, since those areas have an underdeveloped manpower compared to the manpower available in other parts of Iraq. He concentrated on the human element in the countryside and the means which would enable that human element to develop for the better for the purpose of increasing agricultural production. There is, after all, a close relationship between development and any increase in the ability of the Iraqi peasant to be acquainted with the technical methods of advanced farming and to manage his economic affairs, especially with agricultural coops. This would transform the peasant into a different person. I, therefore, emphasize that the development plan was indeed aimed at man, because man is at once the aim and the means.

Dr Riyad 'Aziz: Socialist experiments in the Third World are trying to arrive at a formula which would serve man economically, socially and politically. One of the most prominent experiments among those is that of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, which emphasizes that man's ability to exercise his political rights should be based on an economic and social foundation. Such a base would enable man to exercise his actual political rights.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: Let's try now to discuss the Ba'th Party's position on ownership.

Dr Riyad 'Aziz: The party has not abolished ownership. The Ba'th movement had affirmed as far back as 1945 that the right of ownership should be justified by effort and work, that it should not conflict with the public interest or disrupt national harmony and social justice. That is to say that ownership is legitimate and possible as long as it does not depend on exploitation. In the light of what comrade Saddam Husayn had said (on the question of private ownership and the state's responsibility), we can briefly underline some of the points pertaining to ownership. One such point is that the restriction of private ownerships and activities should not be generalized because that is something connected to the psychological and social conditions experienced by a person at a given phase in time, in addition to the ability of the socialist sector, which is the sector of public ownership and society ownership, to absorb the role and function of that [private] ownership. The second point is that the party's theory on the question of ownership is a self-renewing one which is enriched by practical experience in dealing with ownership problems. This is especially so in terms of the possibility that the party may reconsider each stage of socialist transformation, such as the question of ownership, in terms of restricting its size and kind. A third point is that the party, while emphasizing the foregoing, would not allow any such situation to lead to a state of relative instability, that is to say that it is necessary to establish a state of reassurance to preserve the stability and progress of the rates of productivity. As to the other point pertaining to the reconsideration of the size of ownership, it

is implicitly stated that there should be a reconsideration of the ownership ceiling, which would gradually decrease as the socialist process develops. This also is related to the development of the means of livelihood and the cost of living.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: We can understand from this that the Ba'th Party views ownership as a social function. First, this Ba'thist view of ownership differs from that of capitalism, which looks at ownership as an absolute right, not a function. It is not also in agreement with the communist or Marxist view of ownership which categorically rejects ownership, in its final phases at least. We note then that our party views ownership as a well-defined social function within the socialist structure, that is to say the well-being of society and man, which is one of the basic goals of socialism.

Sahib Husayn: The basic position of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party on ownership rests on the belief in the supremacy of socialist ownership and the control over the economic public life by the socialist people's state, which would engender socialist interrelations and promote the values of collective and cooperative labor. This means that the decisive thrust of leadership action in the process of socialist construction should be one in favor of the socialist sector. This will lead to democratic management since the socialist state, under the leadership of its socialist party which leads the state and society and represents the masses of the people, is the main beneficiary of the process of socialist construction. This general position, however, does not deny the Ba'th Party's recognition of individual ownership, which goes beyond the narrow Marxist concept of the so-called "utilitarian ownership." Individual ownership in the context of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party's belief in individual ownership is subject to two basic laws: the first is that individual ownership at all times and through every phase of the process of socialist construction will remain subject to the controls of socialist ownership and the predominance of the collective, socialist relationships. In other words, if a contradiction were to arise between individual ownership and social ownership it will definitely be settled in favor of the social ownership of the means of production, the supremacy of socialist relationships, and the values of collective and cooperative labor. The second law is the principle of "accepted ownership." Briefly, what is meant by acceptance here is the acceptance by the socialist party of the size, limits and role of that ownership in every phase of the phases of socialist construction. It is a relative, not an absolute, acceptance governed by several social and economic factors related to the nature of the economic structure in the country or, in terms of the future, united countries led by the party. The socialist leadership's acceptance of a certain size of individual ownership means an endorsement of that ownership only for a certain period of time. It does not mean an absolute endorsement of the size of ownership throughout all the phases of socialist construction. This means that the principle of individual ownership is subject, during the developments of socialist construction, to a continuous review with an eye either to reduce that size or change the position of individual

activities in the national economy at any one phase of socialist construction. At all times and through all phases, the recognition of individual initiative governed by those restrictions remains a basic tenet in the theory of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party.

The principle or theory of accepted ownership represents a safety valve designed to prevent individual ownership from spreading beyond control by means of proliferation or a growth in capitalist accumulation, since ownership by its very nature creates another ownership or doubles itself and its activities. Ownership has two features--a monetary return, in the simple mathematics of the economic situation, and a social return, in terms of the size of its activities. By adopting the theory of giving the socialist leader (namely, the socialist party which adopts the principle of accepted ownership in every phase of the phases of socialist construction) the right to determine and endorse the kind and size of individual ownership, we would be providing the socialist leadership with a safety valve which would prevent recognition of the legitimacy of individual ownership from leading to an expansion in the scope of that ownership, thereby weakening in the final analysis the bases of the socialist structure and permitting the emergence of new kinds of exploitation. After all, exploitation during the phases of socialist construction can disguise itself in legitimate forms of investment, especially since the socialist state permits certain investment activities, which may exploit the efforts of others through means that are inconsistent with the ideological position of the leadership party. Therefore, this matter should be carefully studied by the socialist leader, not only to prevent exploitation but also to contain individual ownership and place it in its right context. This is not a tactical position designed to buy time for the process of socialist construction before finally putting an end to individual ownership. It is rather a position strategically linked to the ideological position of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party of recognizing the legitimacy of individual initiative and the right of the individual (within the society and with any conflict with it) to enjoy the forms of individual ownership which transcend the simple utilitarian concept of ownership. The present practices in contemporary socialist societies, particularly those of the Soviet Union and East Europe, permit a certain degree of individual ownership in conflict with the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism. This leads sometimes to ideological confusion. For on the one hand, the Marxist-Leninist text says something, but in practice what is done is something else. Even constitutionally. The latest constitution of the Soviet Union, the one which abolished the principle of dictatorship of the proletariat and raised the concept of the working people, provides for the right of the Soviet people to exercise a kind of individual ownership which exceeds the narrow, simplified concept of utilitarian use as prescribed in Marxist literature. We find, however, that the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party (acting from its particularistic view of the society in which socialism is to be built) establishes an accord between the ideological basis of the concept of individual ownership as it was originally prescribed in its first constitution and as it emerges

in the party documents and the analyses made by comrade Saddam Husayn in his discussion of ownership, the construction of socialism and socialism in one country. And so we find an "ideological basis" for the party's position on ownership, a position which is consistent in its details and particulars with the party's general program for the construction of socialism and its belief in the supremacy of socialist ownership in all economic activities and the control of economic life by the socialist state and its leadership party, including the right to guide the movement of individual ownership and determine the kind of individual investments in every phase of the phases of socialist transformation.

Tahir al-Bayati: It is true that the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party rejects ownership in its absolute terms, but it approves of it in the context of being a non-exploitative kind of ownership. This view had led some people, of course, to gain the impression that it is a bourgeois view. Those people had based their judgment on a comparison with the Marxist view which rejects ownership, although it had endorsed it in the first phase of socialist construction. Actual evidence, however, shows that in some socialist states, primarily Poland, for example, the private sector's share of agriculture is 70 percent. In the Soviet Union, the agricultural sector began to relinquish more land for private utilization. The socialist sector in Iraq began to move increasingly toward public ownership in 1968 and has been doing so ever since, especially in the economic sectors. In 1968, the socialist sector in Iraq represented 26 percent of the economy. In 1975, it had risen to 74 percent. It is hoped that this percentage will increase to 80 percent by 1980. If this means anything, it means that private ownership which has been recognized by the party within a certain context is subjected to a socialist planning programmed in favor of public ownership and social justice through providing a decent standard of living for the citizens. There is, however, another point, namely, that the party's ideology rejects all forms of exploitation that may occur during the practice of socialism. The point was raised by Mr Sahib who noted that forms of exploitation may emerge during the process of socialist application, but that these forms conflict with the party's ideology. The general tendency is one in favor of abolishing such forms of exploitation. The private sector now is incapable of exercising any form of exploitation because it is restricted within narrow and clear-cut limits.

Dr Wamid 'Umar Nagni: In this connection, I find it useful to point out that the position on ownership is not a perpetual and immutable one or a position which is not dialectical. It changes and develops according to various stages. I specifically refer to the stage of socioeconomic growth, or what is called social construction, in a certain country. If in such an Arab country the conditions become ripe and suitable for the nationalization of a certain industry, whereas they may not have become so in another country, it is the right, indeed the duty, of the former country to convert that industry into public ownership, and I don't find anything that should prevent

such a private property in a country where the forces and relations of production have not developed adequately yet, from being allowed to continue to exist until the forces of production and the forces of the socialist state and society have grown enough to be able to undertake that task and transfer that property to the public sector. The second point I want to make concerns the revolutionary Arab struggle in all its dimensions. In most countries which still wage a direct struggle against colonialism and Zionism and which must try to involve the largest number of the masses in that struggle, it is profitable to make use of some owners and proprietors who, in sentiment and interest, belong to the national, popular ranks of struggle. At a different stage, however, the revolution may have ripened, and those people and their own social class will then take a different position—one of opposition to socialist construction. At that point, it will become necessary to uproot that class and transfer its ownership to a socialist ownership. The problem depends on the social productive stage and on the stage of the intensification of struggle against colonialism, imperialism and Zionism. There is a third matter, and it pertains to the question of how to wrest ownership in the basic fields. We said that our socialism is a democratic one designed to serve man and that this necessitates the use of democratic and humanistic methods in the process of spreading socialist education and awareness in the society, including the principles of socialist ownership. This comes to my mind when I think of agricultural collectivization in some of the socialist countries. Those actions included some cruelty and unjustified pressure. The point I am trying to make is that it is possible to use socialist example and persuasion, as well as education, as a means of wresting private ownership and turning it into collective ownership.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: What Dr Wamid has just said reflects the experience of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party in Iraq. The party began with political liberation from colonialism in conjunction with a tireless struggle for economic liberation. In that context, it liquidated large properties, feudalism and foreign capital through the nationalization of oil. After those large operations, it turned its energies to the task of socialist construction and began to tackle the problem of ownership. Here I wish to refer to what was said about state ownership in the agricultural sector, which is a very important topic. One should not imagine that the question of agricultural ownership is perpetually reviewed. Rather, such a review is presumed, especially in the early stages of revolution and development and particularly in the case of those lands which do not acquire their full and real value except through a whole chain of technical and scientific measures, such as reclamation and irrigation. The points we have mentioned should be taken into account under all circumstances, and it is important to provide relative stability for ownership in general and agricultural ownership in particular so that the beneficiary may not be constantly worried about his future.

Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq: Dr Wamid referred to the question of agricultural ownership, and I think that the need for ownership should be defined. Is ownership necessary in the agricultural sector or the industrial one? I believe that it is necessary to define the question of ownership in the agricultural sector at present, because the nature and conditions of agricultural work in Iraq require individual efforts, in addition to the fact that the land's dependence on irrigation requires a full commitment to the peasant, since he is fully tied to the land.

As to industry, if we were to abolish all forms of ownership in the industrial sector and depend on the only return—the return of labor—we would be really moving in a socialist direction. But if we were to allow a certain degree of investment in industries (even if they were small industries) this might lead to class distinctions due to differences in return or income. I would like here to cite the Polish experience in this connection. Poland had imposed restrictions on ownership, especially in the agricultural sector, but it seems that it began to increase the percentage of ownership in the light of the increase in the rate of development in the economic sectors. What happened, however, is that large numbers of citizens, as a result of limited ownership, sought other means to invest their money, through smuggling and other ways, which called for the restriction of the fields of investment and encouragement of consumption trends.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: We can conclude from all this that there are certain sectors which are centrally defined, in which private ownership is allowed to flourish and perform its role in the process of socialist construction.

PART THREE

AL-JUMHURIYAH: After debating some theoretical aspects of the socialist thought of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and underlining the particular characteristics of that thought, the following question should be posed: Is it possible to apply socialism in one country? Comrade Saddam Husayn had posed the same question, and in answering it he said: "The Socialist Arab Ba'th Party's conception of that problem (socialist application in one country) stipulates that, for socialism to achieve its full impact and acquire those capabilities which enable it to cope with world developments, face large blocs and their threats and produce the means and opportunities of material and moral development and progress in all areas so as to establish a new base for Arab revolution, it is necessary to wage a pan-Arab struggle for unity in tandem with the process of socialist struggle and construction. But can we apply the socialism that we want in any Arab country at this stage merely by having the political will to establish socialism? The answer is no. Socialism, in its full extent, cannot be established and applied in any Arab country by itself outside the framework of pan-Arab struggle." Therefore, the will and determination to establish

socialism outside the realm of pan-Arab struggle and outside the unionist concept are unacceptable. The second question which comrade Saddam Husayn has answered is: Can we proceed with the construction of socialism on the single-country level in Iraq while continuing the struggle for Arab unity? Comrade Saddam Husayn answered this question in the affirmative. But how? This is the question we pose here, and the answer we have to provide brings us to the question of socialist application in Iraq.

Dr Riyad 'Aziz Hadi: The question of establishing socialism in one country is, of course, related to the question of socialism and its association with unity. The Socialist Arab Ba'th Party posits the question of the relationship between socialism and unity from two major stances. The first is the nationalist stance which affirms that regional [country] experiments should transcend their own particularities and seek to devote their experiments to the service of nationalist [pan-Arab] goals and to follow a balanced and parallel path of insuring the success of those experiments on the regional level while coping with the commitments required by the nationalist, unionist objectives. The second stance affirms that the relationship between socialism and unity springs from revolutionary flexibility which believes that the interim obstacles faced by the task of establishing the united Arab state should not impede efforts to insure the success of the socialist experiments in one country and use it as a fulcrum of unity, by utilizing the available time and opportunity. This also means that one should not procrastinate in the task of building socialism in one country when the means to do so are available, because the regional socialist structure is in fact another stage on the road to the establishment of socialism in the Arab homeland and the basis for the success of the task of unity. The establishment of socialism in one country, as comrade Saddam Husayn says, is a central factor in the reinforcement of effective contributions to the nationalist, unionist struggle. Accordingly, the establishment of socialism in one country produces the material bases for the reinforcement of the necessary conditions for the unionist struggle, and on the other hand creates the socialist model for the party's ideology. There are, however, risks which comrade Saddam Husayn has emphasized. The establishment of socialism in one country should not mislead us into neglecting or overlooking the nationalist aspirations for Arab unity and for the application of socialism on the pan-Arab level too. So, although the application of socialism on the level of Iraq is necessary and already taking place, it remains incapable, however, of fulfilling the aspirations we hold for the Arab homeland as a whole.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: In his latest speech, comrade Saddam Husayn spoke before the doctors' union about the question of development, when this issue was raised, and also said that all development plans take the nationalist issue into account and fall within the nationalist thought of the party, with the ultimate aim of engendering the material and moral bases for unity. The task of establishing a socialist system in Iraq is one of construction

and struggle. And so Iraq is playing a pioneering role not only in the task of escalating the struggle and fulfilling its tasks for the sake of accomplishing its goals.

Tahir al-Bayati: When Dr Fayiz Sayigh was debating the developmental process and its role as a basis for unity, he raised the following issue: "Development is a reflection of the political system, and since political systems are different, this means that development plans are different too, because each one of them expresses the aspirations of each country, hence they cannot provide a basis for unity. Development should be one of the conditions for the realization of unity and economic interdependence. The articulation of development plans on the scale of the Arab homeland would provide common grounds for unity, that is to say that it would help establish a single political system which would lead the Arab nation to unity. This was, of course, an explosive issue at one time, but it is no longer so. But why do we pose the following question: Can a socialist experiment be established in Iraq, or in any one country—and in this case it is Iraq—which can serve as a basis for the attainment of economic unity and Arab unity? We know that the party has established a dialectical link between socialism and development and socialism and unity—in other words, between unity and development. With this in mind, we note that the means and conditions for the establishment of a socialist model are more available in Iraq than in any other Arab country. These conditions are embodied in the thought and practice of the political leadership. The best example of that is what comrade Saddam Husayn said in 1974 when he was discussing the economic development plan at a meeting of the Iraqi Economists Association. He noted that there are major shortcomings in the plan because it does not represent nationalist aspirations and ambitions—that is to say, that it is a regional plan and not one which takes into account the needs of the Arab nation on the nationalist level. As a result, the plan was reconsidered so as to make the projects to be established in Iraq capable of fulfilling the needs of the Arab nation. The subsequent plan drawn up in 1975 was an affirmation of that point. Furthermore, the means and capabilities of socialist construction in the Iraqi region [country] are not confined to the material aspects only, but are reinforced by a vanguard leadership capable of formulating a revolutionary theory which can embrace the totality of the Arab nation's conditions—in other words, a theory which can articulate the characteristics and features of the Arab nation. This means that socialism can be established in one country provided that it takes into account the nationalist factor, both politically and economically. If we are able to build in Iraq a socialist base sustained by a level of production which can satisfy the needs of the Arab nation, this means that we can at least lift part of the pressures facing the Arab nation—the economic pressures. Since the political pressures exerted by the great powers derive from economic factors, the party and revolution in Iraq, through the experiment of socialist construction, would thus be providing the Arab countries with the means to prevent the capitalist states from exerting

political pressure. This raises another issue, namely, that the economic liberation of the Arab countries will lead to a degree of freedom in taking certain political decisions. Hence the economic factor will lead to rapprochement after having been an element of dissension and rift among the countries of the Arab nation.

Dr Wamid 'Umar Nazmi: Perhaps the association of socialism with Arab unity is the most important feature which can characterize the Arab homeland. Disunity (the basic law governing the Arab nation for a long time) is an imperialist design created to become a law that would pave the way for imperialist domination. Consequently, I cannot imagine that socialism should be built under conditions imposed by the imperialist forces. When imperialism is finally liquidated, Arab unity will be the basic norm for the Arab nation. The establishment of the Zionist entity aims at isolating the Arabs of the east from African Arabs. There is another point which I deem to be important, namely, the question of the economy of scale or the economy of high productivity. Certainly, small and fragmented countries which do not have the qualities of statehood in the contemporary sense are incapable of building socialism and even of development and modernization (even the large Arab countries, such as Iraq, Egypt and some of the Arab Maghreb countries, are better off adopting developmental or socialist economies--better still, the two together, in order to create economies of scale). The French economist (Guil Martinet), in discussing the question of socialism in Algeria, emphasizes that the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union and China was possible basically because of the large size of those two countries and their huge populations and raw materials. He, therefore, believes that socialism in Algeria is an impossible task. He may be right, but it should be pointed out that socialism in Algeria is not isolated from socialism in the Arab nation. There is no true Arab revolutionary who thinks of building socialism in the present state of disunity.

Certainly, factories which produce 20 million units are better and more efficient than factories which produce 12 million units or which produce 50 [sic] million units. Therefore, it seems to me that socialism is not related to unity only as an ideological goal, but also as a political goal pertaining to the possibility of building socialism in one country. This leads us to the second question: Socialism in its highest, fullest and mature ideological form cannot be realized except with the realization of unity or a large degree of unity. There is, however, a real possibility for the establishment of antecedents to socialist transformation, the establishment of a society which would eliminate the impediments to socialism caused by the present state of disunity. This does not mean that we should put off the task of building socialism for an indefinite period of time, until unity finally materializes. For it is possible to build the antecedents of socialism in this or that country, provided that two points are taken into consideration. The first is that socialist development should be

done at the expense of the future prospects of unity, and the second is that the building of the antecedents of socialism in Iraq can constitute an attractive example and a revolutionary cell in the various parts of the Arab homeland, thus drawing the Arab masses not only to unity but to unity built on socialism.

I do not share the optimism that a unionist-oriented developmental process can occur under the current political conditions, and judging from my modest economic information, it seems to me that the present process of development in the Arab homeland evinces sharp contradictions between one Arab country and another. Perhaps the petrochemical industry in Iraq and the Arab Gulf provides a clear example of what I am talking about. The unionist orientation of those industries is unfathomable, hence we cannot tell what is their use and what is the point in following that path. I, therefore, repeat my view that socialism cannot be finally and firmly built except through unity, but that it is possible to build the antecedents to socialism in one country to make them a source of unionist, socialist attraction for the Arab nation. Economic figures show that the volume of inter-Arab trade exchange is very weak, not exceeding 5 or 4.5 percent.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: We believe that you feel that this socialism which we will apply in Iraq is not the aspiration we entertain, because we cannot realize our aspirations except within the context of Arab unity. This is a point which comrade Saddam Husayn affirmed when he posed the following question: "Is it possible to establish effective socialism in the Iraqi country, a socialism which fulfills the goal to which we aspire, or can we only establish socialism within the bounds of the possible?" The answer is that the establishment of socialism in the Iraqi country is possible and necessary, but it will fall short of the aspirations we have in the greater Arab homeland and it will not encompass the material means and capabilities which we need for the establishment of a capable, modern state which can exercise full independence in the society of great power blocs. Therefore, socialism in Iraq is possible within the prospects and capabilities to which comrade Saddam Husayn had referred. As to the other point, socialism has enemies within and outside the Arab homeland, primarily colonialism and imperialism, because socialism seeks to put an end to all forms of internal and external exploitation. To establish it we need very large means and capabilities equal to those of world imperialism. Socialism on the level of the Arab homeland can stand in the face of imperialism with its massive economic, technological and technical strength. This is our very aspiration in the future.

'Abd al-Razzaq al-Dubaysi: Necessity calls for revolutionary measures to reach certain stages of socialism, but it is true that the socialist experiment in Iraq is necessary but costly. Each experiment has its own characteristics or unique features or follows other examples on a trial and error basis. Hence it is a costly experiment, but can be economically

beneficial in the end for the other Arab countries which will follow the same direction. Therefore, although the Iraqi experiment is an endeavor toward the aspired goal, it serves on the one hand as a model, an example, and on the other hand it can be a saving for other experiments in the homeland. It is difficult to claim that it is possible to establish a large material base for socialism in our country, for it is difficult to establish heavy industries here. Such industries require a large capital, a large manpower and a large market to dispense the goods that are produced. Then there is the question of manufacturing war materials. We cannot presently offer much in that direction. For example, the aircraft industry and other strategic industries are considered the principal basis of complete independence for any nation in the world. Such things necessarily require a great deal (energies and markets), and Iraq is not capable of providing that at present. This, however, is part of our aspirations to create the means, capabilities and antecedents for socialism in the entire homeland.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: This means that the Ba'th Party has chosen the hard course, for the construction of socialism in Iraq is a task of struggle, especially under the conditions which surround the Arab nation. Comrade Saddam Husayn says: "An ambition of this kind requires an ideological and political effort in addition to the efforts which are being exerted along the road of progressive gains and socialist construction." In talking about the main ingredients of socialist construction in the country [Iraq], we should concentrate on the following:

1--Ownership and its social function.

2--Specialized and social development.

3--Democratic management.

These are foci which can be addressed in the debate, beginning with ownership and its function under our socialist system. Public ownership of the large means of production belongs to the state, but the party in addition believes in private ownership within the restrictions and general orientation toward designing the structure of the unified socialist Arab society.

Dr 'Abd al-Wahhab: Of course, public ownership of the means of production is a foregone conclusion in the party's socialist practice, and private ownership should be geared toward serving and reinforcing the task of socialist construction to help it achieve its goals.

Tahir al-Bayati: With regard to ownership, the party has referred to it in Articles 30, 31, and 33 of its constitution. In those three articles, the party defined the bounds of private ownership and permitted investment in private ownership. We can briefly outline the contents of those three articles. Article 30 provides for defining agricultural ownership in a

manner commensurate with the owner's ability to exercise full investment without exploiting the efforts of others, and to do so under the supervision of the state and in accordance with its general economic program. Article 31 provides for defining small industrial ownership in line with the economic level which would benefit the citizens in the state, while Article 33 refers to the ownership of real estate needed by all the citizens, and stipulates that such properties should not be rented or exploited at the expense of others, and that the state should guarantee a minimum of such real estate to all citizens. That is to say that private ownership exercised by an individual cannot be regarded as exploitative ownership as long as it does not permit the occurrence of value surpluses as a result of exploiting the human element. With this in mind, we note that the Eighth National Congress (1965) emphasized this question after the crystallization of the course of socialist transformation in the Syrian region. The congress called for the adoption of the necessary measures to mobilize the savings of small investors and to encourage them to participate in government projects by a certain percentage. The participation of the private sector, as a small partner, with the state in the implementation of development projects presupposes the preclusion of the return of capitalist relationships to the economy. We thus observe that the party's philosophy on ownership rests on the following: one, the ability of the socialist sector to manage, control and supervise, including the ability to control and manage a complementary relationship with the private sector; two, a dependence on developed technology and science and their impact on and contribution to the creation of the proper conditions for the realization of the best possible level of production; three, a dependence on the degree of progress in society, the socialist education of the individual and his ability to implement and grasp the tasks of socialist transformation; four, a periodic review of ownership, in terms of its kind, size and orientation, in accordance with a progressive, gradual program which would ultimately bring private ownership to an end, turning it into cooperative public ownership. We therefore see that the process of building public ownership should move in stages, beginning with the economic peaks, which represent the fulcrum of economy, and moving through nationalization acts and measures designed to project the role of the socialist sector and reduce the role of the private sector and prod it into a complementary relationship with the socialist sector. These are actually all the bases set forth by the party in Articles 30, 31 and 33 and clarified in the Eighth National Congress (1965).

AL-JUMHURIYAH: We can conclude from what has been said that the party's view of ownership proposes that the state should nationalize what is termed the economic peaks, and I believe that Iraq has made basic steps along that path, whether in the field of agrarian reform or the industrial and oil sectors or whether in terms of directing the economy toward building the material bases for socialism. Private agricultural ownership has been integrated within a cooperative system, represented by both the cooperative

farms and the collective farms. That is to say that private agricultural ownership has been restricted and compressed. But we do not believe that Iraq has reached the final formula on that score. The deputy chairman [of the Revolutionary Council, Saddam Husayn] says that it should not be imagined that review of agricultural ownership is an automatic and continuous thing, but rather an assumed thing, while taking into consideration the factor of relative stability of ownership in general and agricultural ownership in particular. In the field of industrial ownership, however, the private sector's contribution is very little, as demonstrated by the 1976-80 development plan which can be checked for verification.

Dr Riyad 'Aziz Hadi: I have several observations about agricultural ownership in Iraq. The greater part of land in Iraq is owned by the state. It is either franchised or leased. But purely private ownership is limited. It appeared relatively recently in Iraq, specifically toward the end of the Ottoman era, when the Ottoman state gave some influential personalities lands and properties. The number of those privately owned lands increased during the British occupation and mandate. In 1958, agrarian reform Law No 30 was promulgated with the aim of limiting the large private ownerships, abolishing the various forms of exploitation of the peasants and redistributing the land among the largest number of peasants. However, the aims of the law were never fulfilled, since the application of that law was accompanied by many negative practices which continued until the outbreak of the revolution of 17 July 1968. At that time, Law 117 was promulgated, and it changed the picture of agrarian reform in Iraq and introduced quantitative and qualitative changes in the economic relationships in the countryside where cooperative and collective farms mushroomed alongside state farms. Thus socialist practice began to develop in our countryside.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: Socialist agriculture in Iraq has developed to the point where the number of coops after the revolution has reached 1,900, occupying an area of 12 million donums with the sector of agrarian reform. There are also 79 collective farms over an area of 634,000 donums, as well as 14 state farms which represent full-fledged agricultural projects. The agricultural bank shares in securing the success of that transformation along the course of cooperative socialist application. During the period in question, the bank gave out a total of 13.2 million dinars in loans to support those coops and help them realize their objectives. The realization of socialism requires the intensification of efforts for the sake of social and economic development. There can be no socialist practice and application without a process of development which aims at introducing transformations in the economic foundations and the material and technical aspects of society as well as transformations in the shaping of the individual and groups and their ideological and behavioral relations, systems and norms. Complementarity in the economic, material and human transformations is one of the necessities of socialist application. Otherwise, efforts to effect transformations in the technical and economic realms

without efforts designed to change the human being will not lead to the realization of the goals of socialist application. Man is the aim and means of development, and there will be no transformation without changing man.

Dr Riyad 'Aziz Hadi: The party's concept of development is not confined to the increasing of production and the realization of fair distribution, but exceeds that to political and national dimensions which involve the bolstering of national independence and the building of a model state which is free of political, economic and cultural subservience. Development in Iraq in accordance with the party's program of socialist transformation aims at the following: 1) Ridding the Iraqi economy of backwardness and the impediments to development. 2) Ridding the Iraqi economy of political and economic bondage. 3) The establishment of an economy which secures an increase in production and the fair distribution of economic returns and profits in a manner that would eliminate class distinctions and contribute to the construction of the socialist society.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: Socialism is not measured just by economic development; there must also be a social development which can create the politically and ideologically mature socialist citizen. The future belongs to all those socialist transformations which take into account the economic and human factors in the society.

Dr 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar: Man should feel that he is part of the socialist transformations, that he contributes to them and receives their returns and final products for his own well-being and that of his society.

Tahir al-Bayati: Man is the end and means of development, therefore it is a must to create the socialist man who is characterized by an advanced maturity and familiarity with the dimensions of socialist application, especially since the economic and social backwardness which has weighed down on our society during the past eras had shackled the thinking, movement and effectiveness of man and inculcated in him backward norms and patterns of thinking, behavior and culture. Through its educational, cultural and public relations institutions, the revolution has contributed to the preparation of that socialist model. The socialist instruction institutions (such as the labor culture institution and the general establishment for the guidance of farmers), cultural seminars, the symposium on productivity, radio and television, the press, books and party guidance are all geared to making the people in the country aware of socialism and to creating a socialist citizen whose behavior and thinking are in accord with the society's goals of building socialism. The legislation made by the revolution is designed to contribute toward making the socialist citizen and to mobilize the efforts and energies of all citizens in the cause of development and socialist transformations. Law No 90 for 1975 has brought about equality of the sexes and opened the vistas of mobilizing the efforts of women in the field of development, in addition to creating awareness among the citizens of the

important role of women in the socialist transformations envisioned for the country. Education, guidance, legislation and seminars have produced positive returns in terms of raising the rate of growth in the country. We can see that the percentages of plan implementation or the percentages of growth in the economic plans have begun to increase. The rate of growth in the 1970-75 plan is higher than it was in the past and we hope that it will be higher yet in the present 1975-80 plan.

Dr Wamid 'Umar Nazmi: The question of socialist consciousness and ethics is a basic issue. Within this context, I would like to talk about the phenomenon of the relationship between development and the consumption tendency. The construction of socialism actually requires the intensification of the developmental transformation in the economic and social sectors and the limitation in one way or another of the consumption tendency among the citizens. Capitalism in its formative stages, which accompanied the emergence of Protestantism and Puritanism, called for the limitation of the consumption tendency, austerity, hard work and higher rates of growth. This was true also of the era of socialist construction in the socialist countries. Those countries used to restrain the consumption tendency and channel their efforts toward increasing production and effecting a fair distribution among the citizens. Therefore, we here in our country should share in creating the socialist citizen who believes in development and in raising the level of savings, investment and national income and who is disinclined in one way or another toward excessive consumption in general and "conspicuous" consumption, which is one of the factors that squander national savings and lower the rates of development.

FOURTH AND LAST PART

AL-JUMHURIYAH: Economic development proceeds side by side with social development. The party literature which dealt with this topic has pointed out that economic development should be balanced in more than one area or sector and should be balanced even within the same sector. The talk about economic development raises many questions which cannot all be dealt with in this symposium. For the sake of brevity and concentration, we should therefore broach the subject from two basic angles—industry and agriculture. The question posed to economists in the developing nations is: where does development begin; does it begin with industrial development or agricultural development? Does industrial development follow agricultural development at a latter stage or do the two proceed side by side?

Comrade Saddam Husayn says that we must concentrate on industrial development in order to create the material accumulation as a basis for the construction of socialism. [in italics] In this context, comrade Saddam Husayn did not neglect agricultural development. He said: Industrial development should go hand in hand with agricultural development.

We request the gentlemen to continue the discussion about the requirements of socialist construction and development from this point of departure.

Dr 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar: If we confine the matter to the economic aspects that does not mean that we are neglecting the other aspects. It is only that objective discussion requires that. That is to say that if we restricted our discussion of the process of development to the economic aspects, we are then supposed to note the factors involved there when we deal with the importance of industrialization in its broad sense as a process of basic and evolutionary change in the technical endeavor and the material means of production which produce a change in the level of civilization. The process of development involves a primary factor--a structural change in the economic system, and a secondary one--an acceleration in the process of growth which involves what is technically called in economics the strong push or a series of strong pushes which proceed as an interconnected chain to bring about that process by conquering backwardness and to enter the phase of self growth and greater self dependence. Those two factors, of course, cannot produce the required conditions unless the process is done according to a suitable strategy drawn up to bring about the act of structural change, apply strong pushes to the areas of underdevelopment and eliminate them and achieving the required rates according to what is designed in the plan which is drawn from a certain political, economic and social strategy based principally on a certain philosophy and ideological approach.

What is the appropriate approach in pushing the wheels of development or the lines drawn by the developmental policy which is designed to move the national economy from a state of slump and backwardness to a state of progress and self-generated development? These are the factors involved in the developmental process. If we analyze the first factor, which is concerned with the process of structural change--a process which we have actually experienced in the phase immediately following the outbreak of the revolution and are still experiencing to this day, we would have to ask why is it that a developing country gives priority to industrialization on a wide scale?

The answer is that industrialization, as we know, is an important means to raise the rates of development as a result of an increase in the industrial income and the movement of surplus manpower from agriculture to industry in order to bring about higher productivity and alleviate the tyranny of the agricultural economies which are subject to fluctuations and instability. In fact, industrial production and the expansion of its scope lead to a relative diversification and equilibrium in the production structure, greater stability in production, a greater opportunity to control and stimulate production, economic balance with the outside world, a decrease in the dependence on foreign trade, a lessening in economic bondage and the use of primary materials in industry instead of exporting them. This leads to an increase in the surplus value to which the citizen contributes. This

question leads to various dimensions, including the question of technology and the transfer of technology in a manner which interacts with and adapts to the environment and its potentials in accordance with national considerations. In addition to that, industrialization reduces the deficit in the trade balance--not the transient balance, but the balance in its structural sense. Industrialization also creates a source of foreign currencies and reduces to a large extent the expenditure of such currencies when there is a well-planned and designed internal orientation toward industrialization, whether for the purposes of the local market or exportation to other countries. It also leads to better terms of trade and the bargaining power will be better and more efficient, not to mention the absorption of more manpower and a reduction in the burden of unemployment. Goals of this kind--both economically and socially--are reflected in the projects listed under the plan. Added to this, industrialization, as we all know and feel, boosts the international prestige of the country. These are the scientific justifications which are cited or which stand behind the preference of industrialization. In all this, however, agriculture is not neglected. Agriculture should receive a large part of the strong push, especially in a country which has large agricultural potentialities. The more interaction between the two sectors on a large scale and in a manner which can be depended on to strengthen the process of growth and push its rates forward, the more secure the plans.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: The question of balance in the comprehensive economic development should be stressed here. The revolution has adopted the idea of balance in theory and practice, and therefore took the agricultural sphere into consideration, in addition to the question of industrial development. In its agricultural plans, the revolution took into account Iraq's agricultural potentialities in terms of land and social conditions. It also paid attention to the question of food security and assigned to it an exceptional importance because of its serious impact on the future of the nation, especially since the industrial countries, primarily the United States and Canada, exclusively produce many basic foods and view them in an exploitative, imperialist fashion. Iraq had, therefore, to give this matter a special priority, since it will face battles of destiny and may be vulnerable to an economic boycott imposed by the imperialist states. The revolution has come a long distance in the sphere of socialist agriculture. The question now is: what about rural development?

'Abd al-Razzaq al-Dubaysi: In his talk at the Planning Council's meeting of 20 April 1977 about the role of the socialist sector in rural development, comrade Saddam Husayn pointed to the question of the underdevelopment of the Iraqi countryside, especially the underdevelopment of the human element which has a great effect in bringing down the level of agricultural production. The emigration of the young and educated human elements has also exacerbated the situation. It was necessary, therefore, to emphasize the coops as production institutions playing an effective role in changing and developing the countryside. The agricultural coop as an economic unit

is an establishment, and necessity dictates that such an establishment should be developed from one providing nominal services to an establishment concentrating on agricultural development. As such, it would play a deeper role in providing the Iraqi countryside with the basic ingredients of development in its capacity as a means of educating and guiding the peasants. It can also play a more effective role in the field of credit and as the major provider of seasonal and medium term loans. Multi-purpose agricultural coops are the hope to which we should earnestly look forward and which we should encourage to play a central role in reducing the cost of production and marketing as well as a role of increasing the incomes of agricultural producers. The importance, future and operational sphere of the cooperative movement are growing. The movement grows economically as its farmer members increase. Therefore, the vertical and horizontal growth of coops and the increase in the number of their investments, especially in the realm of agricultural industrialization, will increase the opportunities of social change and progress for the sons of our countryside. The occurrence of difficulties and bottlenecks in some activities of the coops should not lead us to stop such activities. Instead, it is necessary to pursue those difficulties and contain them, especially in the early stages of the coop, or what is called the formative stage. This is where the state can play an important role in nurturing the coops and making them economically effective and strong. Emphasis on the major production of state farms, especially in the rural areas, will also be helpful in developing agricultural production--this, in addition to the great importance of large investments in the area of livestock production.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: In its early years, the revolution concentrated on developing existing industries and running them efficiently and on speeding up the implementation of projects that had already been initiated. In so doing, it stressed the importance of deepening the socialist transformations in that sector so that it may play a prominent role in development. The goals of industrial development, however, can be summed up as follows:

- 1--To form an economic surplus which can contribute to funding investments made under the various development plans.
- 2--To satisfy the needs of agricultural development and industrialize primary materials and agricultural products.
- 3--To satisfy the demand in the domestic market on manufactured goods for the purpose of production and consumption.
- 4--To create the base for an advanced national industry with a pan-Arab dimension.
- 5--To absorb the surplus of the labor force.

May we now discuss the question of industrial development?

Dr 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar: Actually, the question of industrial development in Iraq proceeds within a certain strategic orientation deriving from the strategy of nationalist, pan-Arab development. This orientation can be called "the basic considerations" which have determined the strategy of development in the country. They have been drawn from the political report of the Eighth Regional Congress of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, under the heading of the tasks of socialist transformation. We can outline the general contours of the strategy of nationalist, pan-Arab development in accordance with the abovementioned considerations. It is not possible to separate or isolate the question of industrialization from the process of development as a whole, because the two are interconnected. And to follow up on what has already been said, we can say that the quest for developing forces of production, increasing labor productivity and bringing about a large expansion in material and human investment will insure the rapid and balanced progress of the process of development. There is another point which is concerned with the linkage between the policy of investment and the policy of savings. It is that we should focus on savings and mobilize them in order to develop our intrinsic strength and energies. This is a central thrust in the process of nationalist, pan-Arab development. This point can answer the questions which had been raised about the linkage between the policy of consumption and the needs of development in such a way that the aim of that policy would not conflict with the ultimate goal of socialist development, especially where it concerns the question of raising the standard of living while not neglecting the strategic orientation of nationalist, pan-Arab development as a whole. The other important issue pertains to expanding the export base and developing export industries and the export sector in general. The final point in this regard pertains to raising the level of consciousness among the masses and inducing them to participate in the developmental process, including monitoring the entire process of planning. When we say the process of planning, we mean the formulation, implementation and followup of the plan. This is a democratic feature of the central planning devised by the revolution from the very beginning. The revolution is still promoting consciousness along those lines on a large scale and at the level of all the economic sectors so that the process can be done with full consciousness and to the fullest extent. It is well-known that each strategy has its own means which help implement the strategy. There are many such means, but at the top of them comes central planning and the drawing up of overall plans of development, embracing detailed programs for production, income, employment and consumption in addition to savings, which represents the basic economic variables. Other points pertaining to means include participation in preparing the plan and support of the implementation machinery and the statistical machinery in the case of industrialization. The phase of strategic orientation has been fulfilled and the outstanding projects have been completed. Present factories have been expanded and are operated at a higher capacity. There is a continuing trend to introduce new industries and establish administrative, managerial and organization structures that are compatible with the

requirements of development in addition to establishing a monitoring mechanism and providing opportunities for the national capital to play its specific role within the framework of the process of development, socialist construction and the social goals. If we may say, Iraq has entered the second stage of industrialization--it has gone beyond the first stage of light and simple industries and moved into more developed and sophisticated ones. The strategy and plans of development have given the finance industry a prominent position because of its effective developmental role, and have satisfied the needs of agricultural development in terms of machinery, equipment, pesticides and fertilizers in addition to industrializing agricultural primary materials, realizing parallel development between agriculture and industry, meeting the increasing demand for commodities in the domestic market and turning to export. With respect to investments, Iraq has made wide strides in that field. Of those we can say, for example, that the 1978 development investments equal all funds earmarked for the same purpose in the pre-revolutionary era, within the plans laid down in the early fifties, from 951 [1951?] to 969 [1969?]. The investment funds in 1978 were about 50 percent more than the total funds allocated for the above period. This indicator alone demonstrates the leap in development and the dedication of efforts to realizing high and ambitious rates.

A quick glance at figures pertaining to the era following the revolution (1970-78) compared with the period from 1950-69 shows that in the pre-revolutionary era the overall figure was 1.396 billion [dinars] with an annual average of 95 million. In the post-revolutionary period, the overall figure was 10,207 billion [dinars] with an annual average of 1.134 billion. This shows the relative importance assigned by the revolution to that area which, in the case of industry, has risen from 21 percent to 32 percent of overall allocations.

Sahib Husayn: A central issue in the course of socialist transformation is the question of socialist pan-Arab development, that is the development which has a nationalist, pan-Arab content and orientation and which aims at effecting a comprehensive and radical change in the social and economic map, rearranging the social ladder in favor of the masses who represent the majority, abolishing exploitation and backwardness and sinking the foundations of revolutionary transformation on a pan-Arab scale through a close linkage between national and nationalist, pan-Arab tasks. This kind of development will inevitably express the program of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, leader of the society and the state, and translate the terms and principles of the pan-Arab development plans. This program and the directives of the leadership of the party and the revolution creatively and imaginatively contribute to pushing the wheels of revolutionary change and creating the climate of perseverent work to fulfill the prescribed tasks, correctly, thoroughly and innovatively.

The construction of socialism is linked with the accomplishment of an overall nationalist, pan-Arab development. As comrade Saddam Husayn says, a thriving socialist system capable of standing as a model in the region of which we are a part and able to realize growing prosperity for the people and provide the requirements for defending itself and its principles cannot be built without development. [in italics]

In this context falls the task of establishing a strict balance among the sectors within the framework of the overall nationalist development, that is the task of realizing high rates of growth in the various sectors, while at the same securely linking the channels of each sector with those of the others in a streamlined, well-coordinated movement, so as to preclude the possibility of bottlenecks and provide high capacities for the speedy, programmed implementation of the goals of the developmental plan within the framework and in the service of the task of socialist construction, and in the direction of cementing the socialist values and realizing material and moral returns for the masses which have a definite stake in socialist applications. In short, the development sought by the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, under its leadership of the society and state in Iraq, is a socialist nationalist, pan-Arab development aimed at building the material props of socialist application and developing an awareness of planning among the masses which would make the nationalist development plan--in terms of preparation, implementation and followup--a process of struggle in which all the masses participate alongside the competent machinery. This is why development acquires a decisive importance as a means of expediting the implementation of the programs of socialist transformation and the creation of the new society.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: One of the characteristics of our socialist construction is that of transcending the stage of state capitalism and avoiding its major risks which impede the course of evolution toward the goal of the socialist society. To achieve this, the state has concentrated on democratic practices which rest primarily on the direct participation of all those working in the various economic sectors in the making and implementation of decisions. Such practices are the safety valve which will insure the success of socialist application, which is what we aspire to achieve. We would like the panel to take up this topic.

Tahir al-Bayati: There is a purely economic view of the concept of state capitalism, while our party has its own view of that term. Our party's view stresses the need to shorten the phase of state capitalism and go through it as quickly as possible, or even transcending it, so that it may not lead to setbacks and to the disappearance of the content of socialism as a movement sustained by the masses.

State capitalism in the purely economic view is that stage which follows the phase of submission to colonialism in its various manifestations, that is to say it is the phase of transition to the stage of political and economic national independence. In this stage, the state begins its first operations by nationalizing foreign capital and transferring its ownership and management to the state. The state uses that capital to manage development--this is especially true in the countries which had large foreign investments, such as oil investments, for example. A government's intervention in the productive economic areas forms a governmental ownership which is called state capitalism. It is a stage controlled by time and intrinsic factors. It may fail at a certain point of its development in efficiently handling the country's resources. This would make it necessary to move to a higher form of social organization of the productive process, namely, socialism. The nationalization of the means of production does not mean socialism. The means of production do not become socialist except after they have become shared by the people, that is when they become under the control and management of the production forces. State capitalism is a stage with two edges. It may lead a country to a higher model, socialism, or it may take the country backwards to capitalism, and push it into new directions which eventually would tie the national economy, in an absolute fashion, to the world economy. We have an example of this in the regression from the socialist course charted after the national revolution in Egypt. The regression was most gravely demonstrated by al-Sadat's policy of restoring the old relationships of capitalist production, adopting patterns which insure a linkage with imperialism, developing the private sector and transferring to it properties belonging to the public sector and perpetuating the supremacy of bureaucratic administration which creates a bureaucratic class that exercises a role no less dominant than the role of bourgeoisie and feudalism, violates the rights of the people and spreads bribery and corruption in the society.

This is the purely economic concept of state capitalism. What then is the view of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party of the phase of state capitalism? The party has affirmed that the process of nationalization in most cases lead to state capitalism because of the bourgeois nature of the political agent of change, or because of the low standard of the production forces and their inability to operate and manage the means of production, which impels the state to impose a kind of guardianship on them and restrict their movement. The Sixth National Congress has diagnosed this phenomenon and outlined the risks and negative aspects of state capitalism. It said that the first negative aspect of state capitalism is the weakening of socialist democracy and the emergence of the dangers of bureaucracy which tends to impose a kind of guardianship on the working, productive masses. The absence of the toiling classes and their non-participation in directing socialist construction and the numerical weakness and political backwardness of the working class exacerbate the risks of bureaucracy. Therefore, deepening the democratic substance of socialism, which can only be attained by enabling the masses of workers and peasants to participate in running

the economy, is the only thing that can check bureaucracy's domination of the masses. The party has clearly charted the course which can prevent the emergence of the negative aspects of the stage of state capitalism. It has emphasized that socialist transformation of the society, either by means of nationalization or the socialist transformation of the countryside, should be coupled with opening the way for the masses to take constructive initiatives--initiatives toward earnest contribution to and participation in the process, which would continue to gain strength and momentum until the burden of managing the economy comes to rest on the shoulders of the productive masses when they play their role in the process of construction, especially the democratic and social management of the sectors of production. It can be understood from that that nationalization, which is the legal form of transferring ownership, and that that kind of change does not bring about socialism, and that only the deepening of democratic management of socialism can give socialism its democratic content. The aim of democratic management is to enable the producers to reach the stage of managing and controlling the means of production in a democratic fashion, to establish socialist social relations and to distribute income commensurately with the labor of each one.

AL-JUMHURIYAH: While we express our gratitude to the honorable gentlemen who took part in our panel discussion of the themes posited by comrade Saddam Husayn about socialist construction, we hope that we were able to do some good in terms of spreading the socialist thought of the Ba'th Party, and that the panel was able to fulfill the goals set for it.

9254
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UNIFIL SEEN INEFFECTIVE AGAINST PLO

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Jul 79 p 11

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "PLO Neutralizes UNIFIL"]

[Text] There is a widespread belief in Israel that UNIFIL is willingly cooperating with the PLO and is displaying a sympathetic attitude toward this organization and that most of the units of the international force are treating the terrorists leniently even when they cause casualties among the Israeli personnel. This claim is raised, in one degree of intensity or another, whenever military personnel are asked to express their opinion about Israeli-UNIFIL relations. It is also the semi-official explanation which is given to reporters.

In an information sheet which the headquarters of the Chief Education Officer published (8 May 1979) on the basic facts in southern Lebanon, it was stated in the paragraph on UNIFIL that "there is evidence of cooperation between UNIFIL and the terrorists." This evidence, so it is explained, consists of the claims of the forces of Major Haddad. Afterward, it is stated in the information sheet which is circulated among IDF commanders: "The UN has provided the terrorists with field telephones and has assisted them in extending lines between Beaufort Castle and Kafr Tibnit. The diplomatic mail of the Norwegian force has been used for the sending of the terrorists' literature which is distributed to their sympathizers in Norway."

The charges are serious, especially when they appear in an official document. When I attempted to find support for the two aforementioned claims, I did not find any authorized person who would claim that he had in his possession proof for this (in the matter of the telephone, it was said that even similar lines were extended also between the forces of Haddad and UNIFIL headquarters and the headquarters of its various battalions). Of course, however, this does not prove that UNIFIL is not acting in a discriminatory manner in its relation toward the terrorists

and the militia forces in the enclaves. It is not true that there is massive cooperation between UNIFIL and the terrorists, however all the signs in the area indicate that the terrorists are the beneficiaries of a lenient attitude. The attitude toward them is one of understanding and readiness to find the positive side in their actions. Toward the forces of Haddad, the attitude is completely different, essentially negative. There is an indoctrination toward the militia forces of Haddad that they are the elements which are standing in the way of UNIFIL.

Discriminatory Attitude

The points of departure toward these two forces are completely different. The UN and UNIFIL describe the militia of Haddad as "de facto forces." However, they do not describe the terrorists as fedayeen or Palestinian forces but rather simply as "armed elements." As such, a situation has been created in which a disturbance by the terrorists or an attack on UNIFIL is not attributed at all to the PLO or to the Palestinian organizations but rather simply to "armed elements." It would seem that UNIFIL, by its mandate, would have to regard Haddad's forces and the terrorist forces with the same degree of negativism. However, everything is aimed against the existence of Haddad's militia even though they are Lebanese who live there and whose entire objective is to exist and live peacefully; and not against the terrorists even though they are foreigners, non-Lebanese, who have taken control of the villages and areas in the region and whose objective is to wage war on Israel from this area. The attitude toward the terrorists is like toward official guests of the government of Lebanon who are permitted to be in the area. This is basic evidence of a discriminatory attitude.

In regard to Israel, this attitude does not change. The best proof of this is the UN report on UNIFIL, drafted by Secretary Waldheim. An unpleasant attitude toward Israel is evident between its lines. An impression is created as if the success of UNIFIL depends only on the goodwill of the Israeli authorities. More than this, the impression from the report is that the force was established, as it were, to defend the area of southern Lebanon against the IDF. When Waldheim reports in a criticism of a certain action of the IDF in southern Lebanon, for some reason he forgets to explain the reason. For example, the search which an IDF unit conducted on 9 May in the village of Bra'shit. Not a word was said about the fact that a team of terrorists attempted to penetrate to Menara and that in the incident, one of them became a casualty and two fled towards Bra'shit and the search was conducted as part of the pursuit of the terrorists. The report clearly ignores the source of the problem, from the fact that it was the terrorists who came into the region to fight Israel and those who are not prepared to cooperate with them.

Whoever reads the report in New York will easily reach the conclusion that those who are shelling the villages in the region of the UNIFIL units are only Haddad's forces. Not even one word was said about the shelling of the settlements in the enclaves, not even as an explanation of the background for Haddad's shellings. When mention is made of UNIFIL soldiers who have been killed in an action, Waldheim forgets for some reason to cite the side which caused most of the victims. Of the 25 killed -- 1 was killed by Haddad's militia, 6 in various accidents, 14 by the terrorists, and 4 more in an accident involving a helicopter which crashed while it was attempting to evacuate wounded who were shot by the terrorists, or because the terrorists fired at the helicopter which indirectly caused the crash.

Nevertheless, the impression is that the IDF is not cooperating with UNIPIL whereas thanks are due to the PLO and the terrorists for the goodwill which they are displaying toward UNIFIL. When the terrorists cause problems, the report speaks about certain factions among the armed elements. And even in this case, the PLO is deserving of gratitude because in most of the cases, so says the report, these disturbances were stopped with the cooperation of PLO representatives. In short, the PLO is to be thanked. In the summary of the report, Waldheim also includes an assurance about an action which the PLO will take in the future and which, according to him, will bring quiet to the region. The PLO leaders promised not to open fire from UNIFIL areas, and they promised not to shell the IDF or Haddad's forces from Lebanese territory, if they will not be attacked. In addition, the PLO promised to move all of its offices from Sur. Were it not for the gloomy evidence in the area, this would be a ludicrous comment. Should mention be made of the number of shells which have landed on Israeli (and not IDF) settlements since the publication of the report? Should mention be made of the teams which have attempted to penetrate from Lebanese territory and which were partially wiped out? This is not to speak of the shelling of villages in the enclave. The chief of the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff has already dwelt on the headquarters which have not been moved from Sur, however while the report describes in detail the IDF actions against the terrorists also outside the UNIFIL area (north of the Litani), not a word is said about the shellings of Israeli settlements from that area. In short, whoever reads this report not only will get a distorted picture but must reach the conclusion that the negative factor are the forces of Haddad which are imposing themselves on the villagers and which are activated by the IDF and Israel.

The lenient attitude toward the terrorists in the area does not stem exactly from anti-Israeli feelings but rather first and

foremost from the hesitancy of most of the UNIFIL units to confront the terrorists with force and endanger their personnel. UNIFIL is fearful because the terrorists are the strongest military factor in the area which is not subject to control. The terrorists feel this and know this. In contrast, they are ready to confront UNIFIL, and they do not shirk from killing and murder. This was already evident in the first stage when they killed the senior French officer in cold blood near Sur, and also in other attacks.

In the course of time, the number of terrorists in the UNIFIL area has increased (a fact which even UNIFIL admits today). "Extraterritorial pockets" have been created in the area which, according to the directive of General Erskine, the UNIFIL commander, must not be approached closer than 500 meters. General Erskine even permits armed signal officers of the PLO to circulate freely in the UNIFIL area. Even UNIFIL officers complain about this. On more than one occasion it has happened that armed terrorists have entered UNIFIL positions, in spite of all their assurances. On the roads of the north and next to Sur, the terrorists frequently stop UNIFIL vehicles and remove a "tithe" from the equipment on the UN trucks. They frequently seize UNIFIL vehicles. In contrast to this, this phenomenon no longer occurs with Haddad's men. The IDF put pressure on Haddad's men to return to the UN 11 vehicles which were seized from them before the Litani operation.

Capability for Limited Reaction

UNIFIL's capability to react against the terrorists is extremely limited. Whenever they stop groups of armed terrorists, or individuals, all they do is remove them from the UNIFIL area, and there they return their weapons to them. It is clear that when the terrorists infiltrate into the border region without weapons (and here they arm themselves from secret caches), as has already occurred several times, then the UNIFIL is completely ineffective. The terrorists use a similar tactic against the UNIFIL personnel. Recently they stopped a unit of 28 soldiers from Fiji, transported them to an enclave in Sur, and there released them without their weapons. For some reason, the UN spokesmen forgot to issue a report on this serious incident.

The Fiji unit is the one which is most exposed to the harassments of the terrorists, and the reason for this is their location in an area which is important to the terrorists. This unit controls two important junctions -- Qana and Jwayya -- for the movement of the terrorists. The effectiveness of the other units varies from battalion to battalion. The first Norwegian battalion, for example, was poor whereas the new battalion which

replaced it from Norway was much more effective than its predecessor. The same applies to the Dutch troops who are making a sincere effort to carry out their mission. This cannot be said about the present Irish unit and even less about the Nigerian unit. In contrast, there is no doubt that the Nepali soldiers are the best and most effective in the performance of their duties, and the terrorists also are aware of this.

However, even in regard to those who show a low degree of effectiveness, one cannot say of them, as is often heard in Israel, that they are cooperating on their own initiative with the terrorists. What is happening is that some of the UN units are helpless, and they lack the motivation to cope with the terrorists who are disturbing the peace and who are creating new facts in the area. (Second article in the series)

5830
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IRAQI NUCLEAR BOMB SEEN AS MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO ISRAEL

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 23 Jul 79 p 19

[Article by Uri Dan: "Iraqi Nuclear Bomb -- The Most Serious Threat Facing Israel in the Eighties"]

[Text] A group of Brazilian physicians which met recently with the president of Brazil, General Figueiredo, noticed that he was a heavy smoker.

The president, who for the first time in many years is trying to liberalize the political life of his country, was surprised when the physicians asked him worriedly why he was smoking cigarettes which are injurious to the health.

Without hesitation General Figueiredo responded, "Everytime I think about the Arabs, I light a cigarette."

With this spontaneous response, the president of Brazil actually gave expression to that which is troubling the government in Brasilia: the total dependence of this developing power in South America on Arab oil sources, especially on oil from Iraq.

Iraq, an enemy of Israel of the first rank, is the one who is applying pressure primarily on Brazil to permit PLO activity there.

However, the most serious and dangerous process is no less the "oil blackmail" of Brazil by Iraq.

Iraq, like Pakistan, is hoping to develop as quickly as possible nuclear weapons -- that which is called today in the jargon of the reporter, "the Moslem bomb."

Since Brazil is today one of the most advanced nations in the construction of nuclear reactors (with the aid of West Germany) and in nuclear research, Iraq wants to acquire knowledge and all possible nuclear assistance from Brazil.

Contacts and discussions on this matter are underway between Baghdad and Brasilia while the Iraqis are attempting to connect the contracts for the supply of oil to Brazil to Brazil's nuclear assistance to Iraq, whether by permitting Iraqi scientists to pursue advanced study in Brazil or in any other way.

In light of the great dependence of Brazil on Iraqi oil, the Brasilia government is likely to find itself in a difficult situation on the issue which is the most sensitive today in the future armament system of the Middle East: nuclear weapons.

The French atomic reactor, Osirak, which was mysteriously sabotaged in France a short while before it was to be sent to Iraq is scheduled to reach its destination in a few months.

Initially the French thought that as a result of the sabotage of the reactor, which was damaged by a special type of explosive -- sabotage which the French press attributed to the Israeli Mossad -- there would be a 2 year delay in supplying the reactor to Baghdad. However, in view of the anger which the sabotage of the reactor aroused in the French security hierarchy, and primarily because of the fears of the French, who are also dependent on Iraqi oil, about retaliation by the Baghdad government, the French are doing everything in their power to minimize the delay in providing the Osirak reactor. When the French premier, Raymond Barre, recently visited Baghdad, he assured Saddam Husayn that the reactor would be sent "in a few months." This means that the French want to assist the Iraqis in maintaining their schedule for their nuclear development.

From the secret talks and agreements, which were fabricated between Baghdad and Paris, the French government knows, and certainly the French intelligence service knows, that the Iraqis have procured this nuclear equipment in France in order to produce nuclear weapons.

The government of France officially denies this, especially within the framework of its current contacts with the administration of Jimmy Carter, which is exerting pressure to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

However, even the CIA is trying to keep a low profile on this matter. In spite of the fact that the American intelligence is certain that Iraq is likely to be the first Arab (as opposed to Moslem) country which will be able to produce nuclear weapons in the early eighties, the administration is keeping silent. All of the American evidence for this rests in the secret files of the Pentagon and the American Department of State.

One of the reasons for this is the extended effort, which is being conducted behind the scenes in Washington, to draw Iraq out of the sphere of Soviet influence and bring it into the sphere of American influence.

From the point of view of Israel, it is all the same in that she will be the primary nation in the Middle East which will have to worry about the Iraqi nuclear bomb. And this is likely to be the most serious threat in the eighties, more than most of the Israelis today are able to imagine.

5830
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LABOR PARTY ATTACKED FOR ITS STAND ON NATIONAL SERVICE LAW

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 16 Jul 79 p 2

[Editorial: "The National Service Law"]

[Text] There is considerable hypocrisy and a lack of public integrity in the discussion in the Labor and Social Welfare Committee of the National Service Law and the opposition's obstructive actions. Those who attack the proposed law are none other than the representatives of those parties which for decades have agreed that this law will not be implemented. It was indeed the Labor Party which was responsible for the non-implementation of the National Service Law, and now the same party representatives, as outsiders, come and attack the situation which was created when they were in power.

Indeed, what is being discussed in the final analysis is the perpetuation of the current situation. The National Service Law is not operative. It has now become clear that in order to continue the status quo, a special section is needed in the law which states that the government is permitted not to implement it. Actually there is no change in the existing situation. Before this, the law has not been implemented, and even now it will only be implemented when the government decides to do so. This also applies to the law on the conscription of women. Until today also, women who declared their religiosity have not been conscripted. Only now, the exemption committees have been eliminated, and the effect of this elimination on the dimensions of the conscription is very small.

Representatives of NA'AMAT [Working and Volunteer Women, the Histadrut women's organization] claimed in their appearance before the committee that the main exemptees from national service and military service are women from the underprivileged classes for whom military service is especially important for their social and educational rehabilitation. On the contrary, military service is very hazardous for these women although they are particularly suitable for national service.

There is a need to encourage women to volunteer for national service, to persuade and to explain, however not by legal compulsory means. Women in the national service are performing charitable work. Even Bayt Ya'akov women have begun within a limited framework to become involved in sending women for charitable service. This is a small step forward. However, the attempt to block the law and its amendment by factions which they themselves, during the time when they were in power, did not implement for various considerations is an act of public dishonesty and dishonor.

5830
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ISRAEL PLANNING TO VARY TYPES OF IMPORTED OIL

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Jul 79 p 9

[Article by Mikhael Garti: "Return to Complete Dependence"]

[Text] When the 'Alma oil field is returned to Egypt in 4 more months, Israel will revert to a condition of complete dependence upon imported oil. It is likely by that time the storm over prices and the shock over prices which have characterized the world market will have passed, however it can be assumed with a great degree of certainty that even if the energy crisis of 1979 passes, as did the crisis of 1974, the storm over the Iranian shortage will have left its mark in the form of higher prices for the black gold.

Until the oil exploration branch arranges to continue the explorations -- and in the hope that these explorations will indeed be fruitful -- Israel will have to import 160,000 barrels of crude oil daily in order to satisfy their requirements of the energy economy, which is based entirely on oil and its products (for the purposes of any practical computation, one can ignore the 400 barrels of oil which are produced daily in the Heletz field).

The development of the 'Alma oil field since its discovery was extremely rapid, and it seems that 40,000 barrels a day is still not the final word in the increase of its output. In the very last days of the Israeli flag over the drilling facility, an additional drilling is being conducted to increase the production. In the computations of the oil administration, the refineries, and the marketing companies, the oil from 'Alma has appeared from its very beginning as imported oil, and the Nafton Company has been paid for it in accordance with the price of oil of similar quality on the list of OPEC prices (on its part, Nafton has paid royalties to the nation through the national oil company). The increase in the OPEC prices at the beginning of the month also led to an increase in the price of

oil from 'Alma, and it is computed today at a little less than \$20 a barrel.

\$32 a Barrel

The problem of the price of the 'Alma oil becomes more realistic and painful when one considers the price which Egypt is asking for it. One week ago, the Egyptians announced a general price increase for all types of oil exported from Egypt, and within this increase, the price of oil of a similar quality to that which is being produced in 'Alma is listed as \$32 a barrel. The Israeli Energy Ministry people are still not prepared to address the subject of price, and they note that in the summary document on the oil talks, which the Minister of Energy Yitzhaq Moda'i conducted before the signing of the peace treaty, it was stated that the oil produced in the 'Alma field would be sold to Israel "at world market prices." This expression does not include, according to them, the prices of the free market in Rotterdam where the prices of oil already 2 months ago broke through the 30-dollar barrier.

The price of \$32 a barrel is about \$10 higher than the average price which Israel is paying for its purchases. The exact prices of every oil shipment -- also like most of the sources of supply -- are not among the subjects which the ministry personnel are wont to speak of, however from bits of information which have become available in Israel and from press reports abroad, one can obtain a rather precise picture of Israel's sources of oil.

Some of the oil which is imported comes from Mexico, which recently raised its price for a barrel of oil to \$22.50.

Other countries which sell their oil in Israel do so by means of intermediaries. Among them is Ecuador in Central America. The prices of the oil obtained through intermediaries -- some of whom acquire it from small marketing companies which receive it from large companies and national companies of countries which are not prepared to sell oil directly to Israel -- are about \$2 higher per barrel than the price of the Mexican oil.

Besides its high price, the oil acquired through intermediaries also has additional deficiencies which surfaced primarily during the energy crisis. Some of the suppliers demanded higher prices than those which were agreed upon in the contracts, claiming that had they diverted the oil tankers to the free market of Rotterdam, they would have received even higher prices. In at least one instance, the Ministry of Energy purchasers did not agree to the new price, and the tanker which was already on its way to an interim destination and which contained the oil which

was to be turned over to Israeli control, was diverted to one of the free oil markets, and its oil was sold at a public sale to the highest bidder.

This year Israel also purchased in the world market residual oil (that heavy oil which remains after the light distillates -- gasoline, kerosene, and diesel oil -- have been extracted from the crude oil). This year Israel will import a total of about 1 million tons of residual oil, the price of which after the last increase was about \$145 a ton, as opposed to about \$175 a ton for crude oil. Along with the special Israeli need for residual oil -- which constitutes 65 percent of its total requirement -- it has been found that its supply is more assured since in many countries, in which the consumption of the distillates is much greater, there remain large surpluses of residual oil which not many are grabbing.

One-fourth of the Quantity

The problem of the price of oil from the 'Alma field has not yet been discussed with the Egyptians, and it seems that the discussion has been postponed until the expected visit of the Egyptian Oil Minister 'Izz al-Din Hilal to Israel, the date of which has not yet been set. Although the joint Israeli-Egyptian committee headed by the directors of the national oil companies have met 5 times, progress has been minimal. After the last meeting, the Egyptians refrained from making any commitment regarding compensation for the development of the field and its facilities (the committee is not involved with the supply of Egyptian oil to Israel but rather only with problems involved with the return of the 'Alma field).

Even if Egypt is persuaded to sell the oil from 'Alma at prices which are similar to the average price, which Israel is paying today for its purchases -- about \$23 a barrel -- this will still assure a supply of only about one-fourth of the quantity which Israel will require in the coming year. In about 1 month, discussions will begin with the various suppliers (governments, national oil companies, and intermediaries) in preparation for the signing of the supply contracts for 1980. In contrast to previous years, the sellers are not seeking to advance the discussions, and it seems that most of the contracts will not be signed until October-November of this year.

World oil experts expect a stabilization and even somewhat of a decrease in the prices on the world oil market, however all of them emphasize that oil has become a "precious commodity." The annual cost of 1.4 billion dollars, which is expected to cover the purchase of oil in the coming year, gives this definition a concrete dimension.

In the Ministry of Energy, the last price crisis marked the beginning of a new trend: until now the emphasis has been placed on decentralizing the sources of imported oil. Now the heads of the ministry are beginning to work to accelerate the process of varying the types of oil and reducing the dependence on crude oil and its suppliers. (Second article in the series)

5830
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CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED TO EXPOSE ISRAELI REPRESSIVE METHODS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Jun 79 p 18

[Report by 'Abdallah al-'Atoum]

[Text] Dr Hanna Nassir, president of the Bir Zeit University, said that he and a number of university officials have undertaken a wide informative campaign to expose Israeli repressive methods. Upon his return to the Jordanian capital last week from a tour that encompassed Kuwait, the Arab Gulf countries, the USA, France and Great Britain, he stated that the tour had accomplished the intended goals and showed the dangerous dimension of the closing of Bir Zeit University by the Zionist authorities, and put pressure on Israel to reconsider its decision and reopen the university.

Dr Hanna Nassir added:

This is not the first time that Bir Zeit University has been closed. It was closed in January 1973 when students demonstrated against the measures taken by the military governor who expelled eight VIP's from the West Bank. That closing lasted 3 weeks.

In October 1974, I was expelled to Amman with one of the university trustees, without trial; and that same year a faculty member was expelled after spending 4 years in jail without trial.

The occupation authorities have not ceased their harassment of the university on the allegation that it incites the citizens against occupation, in order to create the proper climate within Israel to close the university.

Finally the latest closing occurred on 2 May, 1979 when the Zionist minister of defense issued a statement which said: The University will stay closed at least until the beginning of the next school year.

We did not accept, however, the decision to close; we thus wrote to various international human rights organizations. I have been working from Amman to introduce Arabic books to the students through unofficial means, while

the university vice president, Dr Gabriel Baramky, and a number of deans have been running the university. The faculty members have been lecturing at students' homes, thus resuming university activities off-campus, especially with regard to students who are graduating this year.

Speaking of the Bir Zeit University role in the nationalist movement on the West Bank, Dr Nassir said that the university began in 1967 to preserve the heritage of the occupied land by creating various programs to instill this principle in the mind of young people.

Among these programs: Volunteer work and fighting illiteracy, research on the occupied land, as well as studies and research on all Zionist violations of international law, such as torturing prisoners, settlements, and violation of the rights of the Arab citizens.

Dr Hanna Nassir moved on to discuss the prevailing situation in the occupied territories and in the Arab world, and said:

As an Arab nation we are failing in our support of the Palestinian cause because the Arab world has not done its essential duty on either the popular or governmental level, despite its realization of the seriousness of the Camp David accords, especially after the statements made by the leaders of Israel that they will remain in Arab lands and will continue the settlement operations even after the 5-year period stipulated in the Camp David accords.

Dr Nassir adds:

Arab boycott of the Egyptian regime is a minimum. I believe that there is no way to solve the Palestinian problem except by fighting. The Arab nation is capable of fighting and may at will impose solutions by force, since it possesses the manpower, money and weapons.

If the Bir Zeit University alone scared the Israeli enemy, how would all the Arabs together affect them?

But the problem we have today is not so much the problem of Arab repudiation as it is that of Israeli repudiation, which is a truly regrettable situation. I believe that fighting from a weak position is equivalent to not fighting.

Summary Information on Bir Zeit University

The first class to graduate from Bir Zeit University was in 1974, and that same year the Arab Universities Union recognized it. In 1975, it was recognized by the International Universities Union.

The university comprises a college of science, humanities, business administration, and next year will have a college of engineering and an institute of education.

The number of students at the university is 1200, and the university is now planning to accommodate 4000 new students next year. It is also building a new campus near the present one.

2760
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ISRAEL

BRIEFS

DIALOG WITH PALESTINIANS URGED--The foremost of Zion, Rabbi 'Ovadiya Yosef {the Sepharadic community's chief rabbi} called on the Government of Israel to open direct negotiations with the Palestinians who will want to speak with us, and to coopt leaders of Sephardic origin in the peace talks. Rabbi Yosef says in an interview in the Parisian paper LE MATIN that if, in the past, Sephardic Jews had conducted the peace talks, the road to peace would have been shorter and crises would have been avoided. He pointed out that the Halakha postulates that conquered areas should be returned to prevent war. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 1 Sep 79 TA]

NEW SETTLEMENT--The third settlement of the Qatif area will be inaugurated in the Gaza Strip today. Its name is Ganei Tal. Thirty-five families will reside there and will make their living by growing flowers and vegetables. The Qatif area has been planned to include five settlements and a regional center. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 30 Aug 79 TA]

DROUGHT THREATENS SEA OF GALILEE--Water authorities have ordered the cessation of water pumping from the country's main reservoir, Lake Kinneret, as of Sunday. Water from the Kinneret flows through the national water carrier to supply most of central and southern Israel with water for farm, industry and home use. The cessation in pumping was ordered as a result of the worst drought the country has suffered in 50 years. The level of the lake has dropped by 2.5 meters and an additional 50-centimeter drop is expected during September and October as a result of normal evaporation. This would bring the level of the lake down to 212 meters below sea level, which is considered the red line beyond which withdrawal of water would endanger the country's entire water system. Continued withdrawal of water beyond the red line would increase the flow of underwater saline wells into the lake, raising the level of salinity beyond acceptable limits. The supply of drinking water is not expected to be affected by the cut, but there is little doubt that farmers will have to face steeper reductions in the water they use to irrigate their fields in the final months before the winter rains. [Text] [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 31 Aug 79 p 1 TA]

CSO: 4805

DR JAMAL AL-SHA'IR DISCUSSES PROPOSED PAN-ARAB SEMINAR

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 20 Jun 79 p 18

[Article by 'Abdullah al-'Atum: "A pan-Arab Seminar in London for Arab Thinkers and Politicians"]

[Text] Dr Jamal al-Sha'ir, a member of the National Consultative Assembly in Jordan, said upon returning from the preparatory meeting of "a seminar of thinkers and political workers in the Arab homeland" held last week in London that the seminar will be held this summer in the British capital. It will include a number of prominent Arab political personalities and will have the goal of analyzing the pan-Arab situation in the Arab world and define its dimensions during a future stage and pave the way for a comprehensive Pan-Arab dialogue on the level of Arab thinkers.

Dr al-Sha'ir added that political optimism is essential for the present stage, despite its surrounding crises, because despair only paralyzes Arab energy and potential and has a negative effect on coming generations. Dr al-Sha'ir advocated maintaining bridges and contacts with Egyptian intellectual institutions and professional unions, because extending the Arab boycott to them would not serve nationalist interests. He stated that parliamentary democracy is an essential formula for political action in Jordan and proposed merging the Senate and National Consultative Assembly if parliamentary elections cannot be held.

Dr al-Sha'ir said that the idea of holding "the seminar of political thinkers and workers in the Arab homeland through pan-Arab ideology" emerged from a group of Jordanian politicians belonging to ideological movements who felt that the Arab political situation over the past 40 years required a reconsideration of the bases of pan-Arab thinking to shed light upon the bases of the pan-Arab process for coming generations, evaluating its negative and positive aspects and searching for a new outlook that can coexist with the realities of the modern world in addition to getting involved in various historical, political, cultural, economic and social aspects of Arab life.

Arab Personalities

The originators of the idea of holding the seminar dropped the thought of holding it in any Arab country for fear that their pan-Arab concept would be linked with one country to the exclusion of another. It was therefore proposed that it be held in London, Athens or Rome, and it was then decided to hold it in London. The preparatory meeting was in fact held this month in the British capital with the understanding that the seminar would be held this summer in London as well.

Dr al-Sha'ir added that in selecting the persons who would be taking part in the seminar, he would ensure that they will have played a role in Arab political thought within the pan-Arab line so that their experience will have been objective, surmounting official or organizational affiliation. The idea was welcomed by a large number of Arab personalities, besides the Institute for Arab Unity Studies which expressed willingness to participate in the seminar. The following are some of the personalities who will take part in the seminar:

Jordan: al-Sharif 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf; 'Abdullah al-Riyahi; Dr 'Ali Muhibah; Kamal al-Sha'ir; and Hamad al-Farhan.

Iraq: Sa'dun Hammadi and Dr Khayr-al-Din Hasib

Egypt: Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal; Ahmad Baha'-al-Din; Mukrim Muhammad Ahmad; and Muhammad Diyab.

Bahrain: Dr 'Ali Fakhru, minister of health.

Syria: Salah-al-Din al-Baytar; 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam; and Mansur al-Atrash.

Palestine: Yusuf Sayigh and Walid al-Khalidi.

Kuwait: Ahmad al-Khatib.

A Nationalist Dialogue

Dr al-Sha'ir went on to say: Although many people are convinced of the necessity of holding such a seminar, one cannot discount the difficulties it will face. However, if the seminar succeeds, it could be the start of an ongoing pan-Arab dialogue that would continue through other seminars to shed light upon Arab political life and would enable Arab thinkers to consider most political issues of the day.

Reservations About Boycotting Egypt

Dr Jamal al-Sha'ir turned to an analysis of the present Arab situation in light of the unilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and the Baghdad resolution to boycott Egypt, saying:

When al-Sadat's initiative started in late 1977, it was clear that Egypt would proceed along the road of bilateral agreements. Nevertheless there was sufficient time for the Arab nation to try to transform that initiative into a more positive situation and to reduce its negative aspects. We, however, encountered Arab action which only began when the al-Sadat initiative reached its logical conclusions.

We hope to see more positive results of the Baghdad conference spirit and resolutions. I do not think that certain actions will get us where we want to go.

Certain actions were more harsh than necessary. Moving the Arab League headquarters from Cairo as "a symbolic action" may have certain advantages, but I do not back the measures to boycott Egyptian institutions that have cultural, professional or unionist forms.

Although most of the leadership of the professional unions and the cultural institutions have no choice but to support the political line laid out by the regime, we ought to assume that they are institutions independent of the systems of the regime and encounter difficulties in working with them, and are not part of them. Consequently, to retreat from such measures would provide an opportunity to find institutions that can have an influence on the regime's systems and try to restore them to the integral Arab line.

Political Optimism

Concerning his outlook on the present Arab situation and the future, Dr al-Sha'ir says:

I have been and still am optimistic, because optimism is the fulcrum of political action in a country that is still trying to find solutions for its issues.

I don't deny that we are living in a difficult stage of our pan-Arab and nationalist life, but I am opposed to spreading despair which, intentionally or otherwise, helps to paralyze the potential of coming generations.

A quick look at a half-century which our homeland has experienced make us open our eyes to many splendid aspects. The Arab homeland is teeming with human and physical resources and scientific skills. These skills must be recruited to work to continue the political struggle, and here lie the specifications for the ideological and political leadership that can do this.

It's true that the Arab homeland is the target of the whole world, not just Israel, but we can stand firm. Although the Zionist phase is based on a long history of planning and enjoys international support, it is still a movement that goes against the tide of history and is not much different from various fascist movements that are skilled at using modern machinery and contemporary organizational methods to maintain domination.

Time is with the Arab homeland, and a citizen has to remain optimistic and to move toward more objective and responsible pan-Arab relations.

Just Solutions

Dr Jamal al-Sha'ir added: I feel that the Baghdad summit represents a foundation for a start forward on the following bases:

First: Focussing on creating political, economic and military capabilities to be a pressure plate to prevent further Arab collapse.

Second: Absorbing and mobilizing popular efforts.

Third: Finding speedy solutions for the Lebanese issue, because it is a weak point in Arab strategy.

Fourth: Working to bring the Arab Republic of Egypt back into the Arab fold.

Political Action in Jordan

With regard to the nature of political action in Jordan at the present stage, Dr Jamal al-Sha'ir said:

Some Jordanians still cling to the traditional political formulae to which they adhered a quarter of a century ago. However, there are those who believe that these formulae are no longer of help in serious political action. I think that those who are looking toward general action in Jordan must draw a link between political action in this country and the realities of Jordanian political and social conditions which I would sum up in the following special characterizations:

The security issue: It has been established beyond a shadow of a doubt that the security shortcomings that result from political activity in Jordan cannot lead the country in general or in any political direction toward achieving its goals. Anyone who really knows Jordan sees that there are various political formations linked with broader political formations that rely on various methods that could breach the security of the country. One must therefore control this matter so that adherents of political views can work without fear.

Political stability: Over a quarter of a century, Jordan has been able to build various intellectual, cultural, economic, union and professional institutions which help in improving and altering the parameters of Jordanian society. This stability has been able to give Jordan a limited form of economic independence so that it can play a role in Arab issues.

Parliamentary Democracy

The issue of democracy: I mean parliamentary democracy based on free, popular elections from which the regime emerges as an executive institution. The Jordanian constitution is clear in this regard.

The elections issue was raised after the Rabat conference, and it became clear that elections cannot be held in Jordan in isolation from its social and political reality and Jordan's pan-Arab responsibilities, particularly the Palestine issue.

The National Consultative Assembly emerged as a formulation that, if not ideal, might be the only one leading to a democratic life based on expanding the base of government and avoiding unilateral or hasty decisions.

At this point we still must return to the national conscience and objective thinking about what a democratic institution should be after the period of time for this assembly ends in April 1980.

A Single Chamber

Dr al-Sha'ir adds: I feel that if the proper objective conditions are not there for holding elections, the Senate and the National Consultative Assembly should be merged into one chamber given legislative powers, noting that the Consultative Assembly was selected on parliamentary bases and represents various segments of society and geographic reality.

As for the administrative apparatus, that should be on the basis that through various forums, the opportunity should be provided for the administrative apparatus to continue in Jordan and to be more receptive and effective.

With regard to Arab relations, based on our faith in political action and our appreciation of Arab circumstances, we believe in the establishment of equitable, outward looking relations aimed at mobilizing efforts to cope with fateful issues and also at economic integration.

Finally, we cannot forget that we are part of an international family with its own special characteristics upon which we cannot turn our backs.

An Oldtime Ba'thist

Dr Jamal al-Sha'ir, a member of the National Consultative Assembly in Jordan, has lived a full life in the experience of political action. He helped in the activities of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Jordan in 1951 and was inspector for the regional command on both banks.

A year later, he went to Britain to specialize in medicine and participated in party activity there. He also took part in founding the student federation in Britain in 1953.

In 1957, he returned to Damascus to continue working in political action for 2 years. He returned to Jordan in 1960 and took part in restoring the party command in Jordan. He was imprisoned several times, and a number of Ba'thists were arrested with him.

In 1964, the divergence in points of view between the two Ba'th parties arose, reaching their peak in 1966. That was a time of political harrassment of political activity in Jordan and Dr al-Sha'ir was jailed several times and then released.

A Jordanian-Palestinian National Conference

He continued talking about his memories of the political period after that, saying: After the 1967 war, there was a political relaxation in Jordan but it came at a time when the nationalist leaderships were fragmented. The entry of the Palestinian resistance onto the scene also added an important factor to Jordanian politics.

When things grew critical in 1970, there was a meeting of 300 persons under the chairmanship of the late Sulayman al-Nabulsi. In March, we elected a committee to take care of holding a nationalist conference in September of the same year. It worked in conjunction with the PLO executive committee to keep a dialogue going with the Jordanian government.

Contacts were held that led to a long session with King Hussein to find a way out to keep the country from experiencing bloody events. The king approved holding a nationalist conference that would satisfy all factions with the provision that this conference would elect an executive committee to exercise supreme responsibilities in Jordanian politics, including the government. However, the follow-on committee rejected this proposal and successive events occurred until the military government was formed under Muhammad Da'ud and matters went beyond the point of turning back.

From 1970 to 1975, I tried to restore the "grouping of Ba'thists" on the basis that it was subject to nothing outside the borders of Jordan, in addition to unifying the party on the pan-Arab level. However, the grouping was dissolved in 1975 and I announced my withdrawal from the Ba'th Party and my retreat from political action.

I resumed political action in 1976 as part of a line calling for moderation and open work, and I participated in writing articles and holding seminars and lectures in this area. I have been one of those who advocated the establishment of the National Consultative Assembly as long as parliamentary elections were in abeyance, and I became a member of the assembly and a reporter for the Foreign Affairs Committee.

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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE CITES FIRST-QUARTER ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Amman AL RA'Y in Arabic 21 Jun 79 p 3

[Article: "Accomplishments of the Ministry of Agriculture Over 3 Months"]

[Text] Sources at the Ministry of Agriculture stated that, as part of the project to improve tree nurseries, during the first quarter of this year about 2 million nylon bags were packed with a soil mixture and planted with tree seedlings.

Also, the 2.3 million tree seedlings produced during 1978 were distributed. The goal of this project is to reforest 150,000 donums of regular forest land to prevent erosion, beautify the area, improve the climate and produce commercial lumber.

As part of the milk cow project, the ministry also bred 227 cows and produced a total of 174,586 kilograms of milk.

The total herd of cattle, including calves, has reached 735 head.

Through the soils and land classification section, the ministry also took part in preparing maps for the development and planning department of Irbid Governorate. This included the following work:

Assembling the information to be put on the basic maps.

Organizing a glossary of agricultural terms giving 19 meanings to the colors and shapes.

Putting the data on the final basic map and preparing it for printing.

The project also assisted in preparing a classification chart showing the production capacity of the second and third stages of Irbid Governorate land and also in preparing a report on exploratory studies of al-Balqa' Governorate land in their final form.

Elsewhere, as part of the fruit trees project, during the first quarter of this year, the Ministry of Agriculture planted 30,000 grafted olive seedlings, 67,000 grafted grape seedlings, 9,500 almond seedlings and 8,100 apple seedlings.

The ministry also built 24,000 square meters of support walls covering an area of 831 donums.

Also, 11,595 donums were planted in fruit trees as part of the same project, and reservoirs and wells have been constructed. It took 15,802 workdays, while rockcrushing and earthmoving took 16,240 workdays. This covered an area of 612 donums.

The ministry also engaged in 15 experiments in the prophylaxis section, 18 experiments in the horticulture section and 42 experiments in the animal husbandry section as part of applied research aimed at finding better solutions for the problems facing Jordanian agriculture in various fields, at introducing new strains of various field, garden and fruit crops and at finding modern methods to help improve and diversify production.

The ministry has also been engaged in an integrated development of dry farming. The project prepared the ground readied for planting for the coming season by spring plowing of the ground sprayed with herbicides.

The project also loaned 80 tons of Hurani strain seeds to the cooperative federation in Irbid and 46 tons to (al-Tafilah) in order to plant 13,000 donums.

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POLITICAL, SOCIAL SITUATION IN SOUTH SEEN DISCOURAGING

Israeli Involvement With Haddad

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 6-12 Aug 79 p 4

[Text] There is a prevailing conviction among Arab diplomatic circles in Beirut that whatever the extent of Israeli escalation outside the country, and whatever the domestic security tension, it will all remain limited in time and place and consequently will not reach the brink of a big explosion.

In Lebanon first, and the Arab world second, there is something which can be called the doors of war and peace. A diplomatic source says that today we are seeing the opening of all these doors in order to reveal what is inside. War is possible, and its entry point is the south. Peace is also possible. In both cases, it is possible for the United States to grasp the reins, with the help of local and regional parties, Egypt and Israel in the vanguard. The diplomatic source confirms that this is the basic factor in the current Arab situation, of which the Lebanese situation remains an inseparable part. It is unlikely that such a situation will change overnight. In fact, the source stresses that it will very likely continue until after the American presidential elections, because of the present White House administration's unwillingness to audit the profit and loss accounts of the Camp David agreements, especially since American President Jimmy Carter is the godfather of these two agreements and is morally and materially responsible for guaranteeing their success, or at least for giving Israel and Egypt room to make them succeed.

The following point of view appeared in a letter from the south by Sa'id Ma'lawi.

"Consecutive events in South Lebanon during the last two weeks, and Israel's military and political escalation, have once again pushed the situation to the brink of confrontation.

"The open Israeli charges that the international emergency forces were facilitating the missions and activities of the Palestinian fedayeen in and across their regions, and the threats against the joint forces and the international forces which Maj Sa'd Haddad made from the Ramban Hospital

north of Haifa, indicate that an Israeli military escalation will occur. Everyone put their hands over their hearts. Israeli warplanes raided and killed, set on fire, defaced and destroyed. What the airplanes didn't finish was done by long-range 175-mm artillery and the border police forces artillery, which for five days without stop pounded scoures of southern villages, from Tyre in the west to Shaba' in the east. Homes were destroyed, property set on fire, and new names added to the list of victims.

"In this disturbed atmosphere, in spite of the prevailing pessimism of various partisan, popular and military circles in Lebanon in general and the south in particular, a few observers insisted that the thread of optimism had not yet been severed, and that the nature of the phase calls for these military jolts from time to time. They added that if Israel would 'walk all over' the UN forces in the south and overcome this moral international obstacle, there would be 'peace in the world.' They expect more attack and retreat operations to take place, but within a very limited scope, although the idea of nibbling away at the south up to the Litani rivercourse is absolutely out of the question. These circles make it no secret that in this sphere Israeli intentions are ready to be carried out. As for the American red light, it is still an obstacle in Israel's path.

"What is there in the south except death, the roar of cannon, and emigration?

"Confirmed reports say that the Israelis recently gave Maj Sa'd Haddad's forces about 30 armored cars, which were distributed to three sectors in the south. However, the Marj 'Uyun region received the lion's share, at its collection center near Nab' al-Dardarah on the al-Khayyam plain. Advanced artillery batteries were brought in and emplaced on the outskirts of Marj 'Uyun and al-Khayyam, and were actually used not long ago. Inside the militia region, the end result is that there are a number of conflicting military wings there, one of which is led by a volunteer army non-commissioned officer under the banner of 'Aj Ger Sa'd Haddad, a so-called Ma'ruf Abu-Rihal from al-Qulay'ah. Most of the soldiers at the Marj 'Uyun barracks are sympathetic with his stand, which leans towards the legitimate Lebanese authorities, especially after the promulgation of the new defense law and the army leadership's retreat from its decision, more than 2 months ago, to cut off the salaries of those non-commissioned officers and individuals who had served more than 15 years--salaries granted them according to the new pension law. The army leadership was informing them, in its own way, that it was restoring their salaries as part of a basic condition--that they set out of their anomalous situation by whatever means, otherwise this leadership would be forced to abandon them totally and they therefore would lose their rights. Because of this stand by the army leadership, it has begun encountering attentive ears among those soldiers. Maj Sa'd Haddad's entering the hospital last week was nothing but the first preface to what will happen in a short time. In spite of the Israeli denial that Sa'd Haddad was exposed to an assassination attempt, reports coming from the border villages confirmed that a mine was planted by Abu Iskandar's followers in a place in the town of Rashed frequented by Sa'd Haddad, because of previous disagreements between the two, and that it exploded while Haddad

was there. He and two companions were injured, the other two seriously. They were all taken by Israeli helicopter to Haifa. This was Haddad's fifth exposure to assassination since he took over the leadership of the militias in the south 3 years ago. He entered the surgery ward only to have the wounds bandaged and to give himself some rest. 'The news is 100 percent exact and correct.' In this case, Israeli intelligence, headed by 'Iej Yuwam Mizrahi, is trying to cross over again, by means of the militias which is trained and toiled over and the command of which was given to Ahmad Shayt from Kafr Kala, because the close to 400 Lebanese soldiers in the border villages had insisted on apparently returning to the banner of the legitimate Lebanese authorities. The recent transfer of 'Iej Haddad's family from Marj'Uyun to the occupied territories to live there was only the start of a new situation. Even Haddad himself doesn't yet trust the military persons closest to him. For him to stay in the town of al-Qali'ah without Israeli tracked vehicles, intelligence, and redoubled guard has become next to impossible.

War Damage, Losses

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 1 Aug 79 p 4

[Text] Yesterday the Joint Command for the South held a press conference at the press union headquarters, attended by Press Union Leader Riyad Taha and Executive Secretary General of the National Movement's Central Political Council Nuhsein Ibrahim.

The Joint Command's information official, Mahmud Sha'ban, read a comprehensive statement covering the current situation in the south. The statement said, "The Lebanese South is not only the site of collision with the enemy, but has become an arena of intense political activity in which all the fundamental, furious contradictions and struggles between the forces of progress and liberation on the one hand and the forces of reaction, backwardness and agentry on the other hand are embodied."

The statement added, "The south is the direct door to either the Zionization of all of Lebanon or to the guarantee of its national course and personality. As for the state's attitude, it was and still is one of totally ignoring the reality of the danger--it is, in fact, a stand of serious participation in the manipulation of the land, people and destiny of Lebanon. The state, through its collusion with the phenomenon of the 'Ministate of Free Lebanon', is insuring a cover of legitimacy for Israel so that it can continue with its aggressive, expansionist policy."

The statement speaks of the attitude of the citizens in the border villages, saying, "A large part of our Christian border people are refusing to extend their hands to the hands of the Zionist enemy, which are stained with the blood of our Lebanese people of various factions. This proves that the patriots of various factions are in one trench, and that the agents and plotters from all factions are also in one trench. (The stand of the mayor of al-Qali'ah, who refused to sign birth certificates obtained in Israel, is only one of many examples.)"

The statement added, "We in the south are the bulwarks of the front-line Arab nation and its heart, which receives the bullets of the vast plot aimed at bringing our Arab people to their knees in the morasses of humiliation and surrender.

"Today the progressive Arab states must bear their responsibility for providing greater military material support, through various methods, means and capacities."

Then the statement spoke of the current situation in the south and about the results of the war which Israel is waging against the southerners, saying, "We in the south are subject to a true war of extermination. The roar of cannon goes on every day and the bestial air raids provide a model study in barbarism and savagery against children and defenseless people. Israel wants to continue the destruction of the arteries and appurtenances of our public life. Take some quick, concise examples.

1. To date there are close to 250,000 emigres, all of whom are suffering from extremely grave living conditions.
2. To date 5,000 homes have been destroyed.

3. Some villages have been totally abandoned and destroyed, such as al-Khayyam, al-Taybah, Yarin, Maruhin, Rabb Thalathin, al-Bistan, Hanin, Ibl al-Saqi, al-Chanduriyah, and Rashshaf.

"We might mention the losses suffered by all these villages. In al-Khayyam, 1,000 homes were destroyed; in al-Taybah, 700; in Hanin, 190; in Tibnin, 180; in Rashif, 200; in Tyre, 150; in Marun, 100; in al-'Abbasiyah, 150; in al-Bazuriyah, 100; in al-Qantarah, 70; in Qana, 100; in al-'Azziyah, 40; in al-Chanduriyah, 60; and in Rashaya al-Fukhkar, 200 homes.

"Add to that the destruction and shattering of hundreds of other homes in other villages and towns.

"As for loss of life, according to the statistics of the compensation lists prepared by the National Movement, to date more than 1,000 dead and 3,000 wounded have fallen on southern soil, most of them defenseless civilians."

In the context of economic losses, the statement mentioned that southern tobacco cultivation, which constitutes about 75 percent of Lebanon's tobacco cultivation, has been destroyed, and that in 1979 the resulting losses amounted to about 60 million Lebanese pounds.

As a result of the continual raids, thousands of dunums of land planted with grain, citrus fruits, grape vines and olive trees have been devastated and set on fire. The Hasbaya region's losses from grape vine fires have amounted to 20 million pounds.

The al-Taybah electric power plant has also been destroyed, and pumping stations in Tyre and Sadiqin have been put out of service. The Tibnin government hospital has been closed and the Tyre port has ceased to function. This is on top of the idling of thousands of laborers employed in tobacco cultivation, vegetable gardens, fields, sea fishing, crafts and other industries.

Then the statement spoke of the state's negligence in the field of vital public services for southern citizens, saying, "At present in the south a big problem is insuring water. As an example we might mention that in Jabal 'Amil alone more than 100 villages are complaining of a problem of actual drought, while the state is not taking any step which would even partially help solve this tragic problem.

"In the health services field, official health activity stopped more than 3 years ago in the districts of Hasbaya, al-Nabatiyah, Tyre, Bint Jubayl, and al-Zahrani. Government clinics were closed, in addition to the Tyre hospital, the Tibnin hospital and the Sidon hospital; the Marj'Uyun hospital alone is operating. While we are glad this hospital is in operation, we ask about the underlying reason for the state's continuing to close some hospitals and not others.

"In the educational field, the state has not taken any step worth mentioning to repair and renovate schools and supply them with the necessary, urgent equipment.

"The state has also resisted making any contributions for compensations to relatives of the dead and wounded or to owners of buildings and farms. As for the Southern Council, it is not doing anything in the sphere for which it was founded."

The statement quoted from a memorandum from the governor of the south which was submitted to the prime minister and which was published in AL-SAFIR on 16 July 1979, to the effect that the governor considers the loan given him "insufficient to meet current demands."

With respect to the National Movement's accomplishments in helping the south, the statement mentioned the following achievements:

1. The provision of aid to thousands of emigres;
2. compensation for martyrs and wounded;
3. the operation of the Tyre government hospitals from 1976 till now, and the establishment of scores of clinics in various southern districts, in addition to the distribution of free medicines and the purchase of a number of ambulances (over the last 3 years our contributions to the health field have amounted to more than 6 million pounds);
4. the renovation, construction and repair of a large number of school buildings;

5. the paving, repair and maintenance of a large number of public roads;
6. the insuring of water for a number of regions, and the drilling of wells in other regions;
7. the excavation of air raid shelters in some districts; and
8. the establishment of popular security agencies and these agencies' effective participation in controlling the security situation, preventing violations, arresting criminals, insuring regular guards and patrols, and preventing offenses against public property.

"Here we must point out that we have requested the cooperation of internal security officials in the south, but we have received no response."

The statement spoke of the role of the joint forces in the south, saying that our fighters have shifted from the stage of struggle to the offensive, and have carried out operations in the depths of Zionist occupied areas.

The statement announced the opening of the camps to all natives for volunteer work, training and organization, and said that defending the south is the duty of all of us.

The International Forces

Then the statement turned to the role of the international forces in the south, saying that "These forces are not carrying out the role designed for them according to the basic task assigned to them. Therefore we call on them to insure complete Israeli withdrawal from the entire south, since Israel still holds 1,000 square km of southern territory. We also appeal to them to bear their responsibility for defending the villages located in their sphere of activity; these villages are constantly exposed to attacks and incursions by the Israeli occupation forces (the most recent example being the occupation of the towns of al-Taybah and Bait Yahun which are located in the emergency forces' areas)."

The statement concluded by calling on the progressive Arab regimes and world liberation forces to support the south and to act immediately to

1. construct a minimum of 300 shelters in various southern regions;
2. establish 50 clinics in the districts of Tyre, al-Nabatiyah, Bint Jubayl, Hasbayya, and al-Zahrani;
3. provide 5 million pounds to build a fully-equipped hospital in the south, on the basis of a study we made especially for this project;
4. drill at least 50 wells in various districts, as well as repair and put into operation the water plants in al-Taybah, Ra's al-'Ayn and Sadiqin; and

5. supply and support the military effort of the Lebanese National Movement fighters in the south with all means, capabilities and military combat resources.

The statement said, "And finally, we ask the Lebanese state to exonerate itself for the millions of dollars it has received in the name of the south and its people's disasters and tragedy by official statements made to Lebanese, Arab and world public opinion."

8559
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FINANCE MINISTER DISCUSSES ARAB PROBLEM, OIL POLICY

Doha AL-'URUBA in Arabic 21 Jun 79 p 7

[Article: "Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz Asserts That There Can Be No Solution to the Arab Problem Without the Recovery of Jerusalem"]

[Text] Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Khalifa al-Thani, minister of finance and oil, stated that: "Jerusalem is the crux of the Arab problem and there can be no solution except through the recovery of Jerusalem and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination on their own lands. Jerusalem will not remain in the possession of the Israelis very long."

Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Khalifa al-Thani also stated that Arab oil has the potential to play an effective role in settling the Arab problem whether through increased prices or a limit on the increase in production.

In his interview with two Saudi papers, AL-JAZIRAH and AL-YAWM, the minister asserted: "What concerns us now as Arabs is that we concentrate on the political role to settle the differences in the Arab arena, and this requires time and a higher level of understanding and effective coordination through the Arab foreign ministers."

When asked if he supported imposing an Arab oil embargo similar to the one in 1973 during the October War, the minister replied: "If an embargo would achieve what we Arabs are striving for, why not use it. But if it is merely for intimidation, then it might not achieve the desired advantage or objective."

In this interview, the minister also urged the OPEC states to set up a strong information organization to respond to the damaging campaign which Western information agencies are waging against the Arab oil states, asserting that the Zionist press is behind this campaign.

He said, "We previously offered this suggestion to Arab information ministers to form an information organization for the OPEC states."

The minister of finance and oil implored states throughout the world to lower their consumption of oil because it is a wasting resource, and said:

"We must be wary of what the Western states and the oil companies in their orbit are doing to form large reserves to put pressure on oil prices so that they will stay low."

Concerning the next meeting of OPEC, the expected increase in oil prices and Qatar's position on this increase, the minister said. "Qatar is not taking an individual position on this decision, and must pursue a wise course with regard to oil price increases, because we must know the complications involved in such a decision."

The minister indicated that the time has come for oil policy to become flexible for the present, and Qatar's position on this is a careful and balanced position.

In reply to a question about OPEC's next position on oil companies which raise their prices at the expense of the oil-producing countries, 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Khalifa al-Thani explained: "The oil companies as a whole constantly exploit the situation. Some companies are putting pressure these days on the Western states to take one position or another. Some of these companies must be reconsidered, and if necessary placed on OPEC's black-list if they continue this practice."

The minister of finance and oil added: "There is no item on the agenda for OPEC's next meeting, but if the oil ministers deem it appropriate they will discuss it."

The minister asserted that joint coordination exists in the oil sector. In this connection, he referred to his meeting with Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabia's minister of petroleum and mineral wealth: "This meeting was about coordination in current oil policy and the oil disturbances which the market is experiencing."

He mentioned: "There is general agreement concerning the standardization of prices inasmuch as this would be the most profitable thing for OPEC, and because we are betting on the organization and it must come back to one price or else become a weak organization."

When asked whether OPEC's role had been limited to pricing policy alone, 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Khalifa al-Thani responded: "The organization's role has been limited to increasing prices until the end of next December. However, with the flare-up in the oil market at the present time, the organization has to have a single price rather than several prices. This is what creates a certain amount of weakness in the organization."

The minister of finance and petroleum added: "The existence of several prices is tantamount to a reduction in the organization's role." He also asserted: "There has been an increase more in the accounting of oil prices, because in fact they are offset by high rates of inflation in the prices of all the products of the industrialized states."

The minister denied that Qatar would increase its oil production over the present rate. He also denied that the OPEC states had decreased their oil production.

Replying to a question concerning the purpose of an oil embargo similar to that of 1973, the minister stated: "If this embargo gains an advantage for Arabs, it will be used. If it does not gain this advantage, it will not be used."

With regard to the Conference of Arab Planning Ministers of the Arabian Peninsula which concluded its activities 2 days ago, the minister indicated: "It embodied the spirit of solidarity and anchored the foundations of joint coordination so that there can be cooperation, scientific training and exchange of plans, first among them the defense of religion and homeland."

In reply to a question concerning French President d'Estaing's proposal to cooperate with the OPEC states to reduce world consumption of oil, the minister welcomed everything which would tend to cause a reduction in the consumption of energy, calling for a resumption of the North-South Dialogue, and asserting that OPEC has made good progress in helping the developing state by its establishment of the OPEC fund through which it has provided aid to the Third World states which have suffered from the increase in oil prices.

8591
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NEW AMERICAN MANEUVER AGAINST PALESTINIANS ALLEGED

Doha AL-'URUBA in Arabic 26 Jun 79 pp 10-11

[Article by the editor-in-chief: "New American Maneuver Against the Palestinians"]

[Text] On the sixth day of the October War, the Egyptian president called a halt to the fighting and issued a call for an international conference in Geneva to be attended by all the conflicting sides in the Mideast issue as well as the primary big powers, in particular the United States and the Soviet Union.

At that time, this call for a conference raised a number of questions. Some of them pertained to the nature of the war launched by the Egyptian president, some to the objectives of this war. But the most important questions pertained to the Egyptian president's insistence on holding the conference "immediately," guaranteeing "immediate" withdrawal to the big powers and requiring that the conference make perfectly clear decisions different in nature from the ambiguous decisions which had previously been taken by international organizations and had been subject to various interpretations.

As to the nature of the war, there were various opinions which became more diverse and complex with the passage of time and the publication of memoirs by the real heroes of this war, including Lieutenant General al-Shadhili. However, the total of what was and is said about the nature of this war was summed up by observers in the following points:

--The Egyptian political leadership intended for the war to be a political war of "instigation," whereas the military command sought a war of total liberation. While the Egyptian political leadership surprised the military commands with its decision to stop the war, and the military commands had differed with the political leadership from the beginning over what the war could achieve politically and militarily, both groups have used the events which occurred at that time to provide arguments to support their positions. Thus the politicians say that the breach of al-Dafarsuwar and the Zionist penetration signaled the beginning of a war with the United States, a war which Egypt did not have the capacity to sustain. The military commanders,

on the other hand, say that it was the political leadership which diminished the importance of the breach of al-Dafarsuwar and prevented the army from advancing towards the Mitla and al-Jadi passes and on to the borders of occupied Palestine--noting that the army was then capable of doing this--and especially that by its political decision Egypt threw the Syrian front into confusion and left Syria to fight alone.

--With regard to the war's objectives, the Egyptian political leadership wanted a limited war which would end when the other bank of the canal had been overrun, and had hopes that such an operation would accomplish its objectives. In the first place, the politicians sought to restore the Arabs' confidence in themselves, their armies and their political leaders and cause them to negotiate with the Israeli enemy without any "complexes" or "impediments." In the second place, the political leadership wanted to propose new conditions for negotiation in lieu of those which the enemy state had laid down after the defeat of 1967. As for the Egyptian military command specifically (and here we are speaking of the actual military command at that time, not the command which was set up after the war to achieve specific political goals), it saw the war as a total war which would not stop where the political leadership wanted it to but proceed into the heart of occupied Palestine, especially since the Syrian forces from the north were able to liberate a significant portion of Palestinian territory and reached as far as the Sea of Galilee. The Egyptian military command says that were it not for the Egyptian political leadership's decision to stop the war at the Bar Lev Line, the Israeli forces would have been unable to gather themselves to occupy the areas which the Syrians had liberated anew. Egyptian military pressure, had it been relied on, could have been an important factor in dealing a fatal blow to the Zionist enemy's state within the lands occupied in 1948.

Here the Egyptian military command is speaking of the political leadership and pointing an accusing finger at it. Indeed, it is going so far as to accuse this leadership of conspiring against the war and its objectives.

Events have confirmed all the accusations of the Egyptian military command. For why did the Egyptian president stand in the way of the Egyptian Army's advance? And why did he leave the Syrian Army alone on the battlefield from the third day of the war? And for what reason did he prevent the Egyptian military command from responding to the breach of al-Dafarsuwar and encircling it before things got out of control?

The Egyptian military command answers such questions by saying that the president of Egypt was bound by agreements with America which specified the nature and objectives of the war, and that from the beginning he conspired against the Egyptian and Syrian armies in the interests of the Israeli enemy and the United States.

Since that time, the true Egyptian military command has felt that the president of Egypt would proceed with the signing of a settlement with the

Zionist enemy's state, and that he had placed the power and honor of Egypt and the power of the whole Arab world in the balance in his agreements with the United States in order to reach a separate peace which did not even achieve the "concessions" that Israel made directly after the 1967 war. Then why the war? And why victory if the politicians were going to transform it into losses which outweighed the military losses of 1967?

All the evidence indicates that there is a maneuver underway which aims at:

--Using the partial victory to benefit the Zionist enemy, not Egypt and the Arabs.

--The start of negotiations is also a maneuver which will have the same outcome as the war.

The Egyptian president wanted the negotiations on the sixth day of the war to be comprehensive and to produce solutions "immediately" without any ambiguous provisions, but it was he himself who dealt the fatal blow to these negotiations when he single-handedly originated accords which separated the first and second conflicts and eased the time schedule to the advantage of Israel.

Even within the scope of the maneuver to attain the limited victory which the Egyptian president sought by agreement with the United States, it was still possible for all parties to meet around the conference table in Geneva and arrive at results backed by the Soviets and Americans. But it was the Egyptian president who opposed the opening of these negotiations in the interests of Israel, and it was he who launched the attack on the American-Soviet statement (the statement of October 1977 which forced the United States to acknowledge the rights of all sides, including the Palestinian people). The odd thing is that Israel followed rather than preceded Egypt in rejecting the Soviet-American statement, noting that it was in the interests of Israel--not Egypt--to remove the Soviets from the negotiations, and with them the PLO.

Today, after the political objectives which the Egyptian president sought from the 1973 War have been achieved--that is, after he has transformed the 1973 War into a more horrible loss than the rout of 1967, after he has succeeded in dissociating the Soviets and with them the PLO, after he has concluded a separate peace, and after he has given the Zionist enemy's state time to catch its breath--the Egyptian president finds himself facing a predicament.

It is a predicament which entails disclosing his international commitments, challenging the resolutions of the Rabat summit conference which stipulate that the PLO is the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people, violating the decisions of the Arab League concerning a separate peace agreement, transforming Egypt into an American-Israeli plantation, and dealing with popular resentment with Egypt and Arab resentment outside of Egypt.

Faced with this predicament which entails disclosing his international commitments, challenging the resolutions of the Rabat summit conference which stipulate that the PLO is the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people, violating the decisions of the Arab League concerning a separate peace agreement, transforming Egypt into an American-Israeli plantation, and dealing with popular resentment within Egypt and Arab resentment outside of Egypt.

Faced with this predicament, it appears that the Egyptian president wants to make another maneuver through his arrangement with the United States to return to the Soviet-American statement and by his open wooing of the Soviet Union. Perhaps in this way he can convince the Soviets that restoring their relations with Egypt intersects with two things:

Stopping the campaign against the accords, and beginning a new maneuver called the Geneva Conference.

Thus, if a return to the Geneva Conference is actually announced, the Egyptian president will work in coordination with Israel and the United States to ease the time schedule, and if this happens then only God knows what is in store. In this manner, he will strike at the Geneva Conference itself, and the Egyptian-Israeli accords will remain as they are.

Arabs must be on their guard against this new maneuver.

8591
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SELECTIVE CHARACTER OF AMNESTY OF POLITICAL PRISONERS CRITICIZED

Paris LE MONDE in French 5-6 Aug 79 p 1

[Text] Bulletin from Abroad. Appeasement in Tunisia

By pardoning Habib Achour, former secretary of the General Union of Tunisian Workers, President Bourguiba has begun to close one of the darkest chapters of his country since independence. The image of Tunisia as "legalistic" and "respectful of human rights," constantly presented by the chief of state, was in fact gravely altered by the condemnation of the union leader on 10 October 1978 to 10 years' hard labor for attacking the internal security of the state. Actually, no decisive proof was presented at the trial concerning his responsibility in the bloody riots of 26 January in Tunis, which resulted in 51 dead and 325 wounded according to official figures.

Tunisia also lost prestige in the Western democracies as a result of frequent violations of human rights which are represented by arbitrary arrests, condemnations for a difference of opinion in spite of constitutional guarantees, and even causes of torture which are strongly denounced by the International Federation of the Rights of Man by Amnesty International. Among others, there was the case of the "forgotten ones" in the penitentiary of Borj-er-Roumi, sent to prison 5 years ago, after which, in an unprecedented decision, the chief of state "withdrew" a first degree of pardon on their behalf. President Bourguiba, who is sensitive to international reactions, has just pardoned six of these opponents as well as two others who were condemned for their political activity.

The chief of state's gesture of clemency and appeasement was unanimously desired. It was welcomed in Tunisia, and immediately hailed around the world by trade unions and international organizations which has most vigorously denounced the high-handedness. Their satisfaction is still limited, however, due to the selective nature of the release. President Bourguiba has, in fact, pardoned the chief, but not his lieutenants. Fourteen collaborators of M. Achour, sentenced at the same time as he, remain in prison, as do approximately 100 political militants and trade unionists, of whom 20, who were implicated in the distribution of the

clandestine newspaper AL SHA'B, must appear before the Tunisian court of summary jurisdiction on 11 August.

In the eyes of some people, the fact that the chief of state chose 3 August, the date of his 76th birthday, rather than the 25 July, the national holiday, to exhibit his clemency, shows that he wished to stress the humanitarian rather than the political nature of his action. However, a few weeks away from the Neo-Destour congress planned for September, others see in the presidential decision the beginnings of political openmindedness and the promise of more democratic institutional operations. The fact that Tunisians have the opportunity to choose between two candidates per seat in the next elections, as is the case in Algeria, certainly constitutes a step forward, but for the time being Tunisia seems unable to set aside the single party.

On the other hand, while proclaiming itself "socialist," it practises, more and more, economic liberalism which closely approaches that of Morocco. Also, the considerable "openness" toward an opposition party which is demanded by "multipartyism," is less intended to open the way to pluralism than to devote all energies to the congressional victory of the prime minister, Hedi Nouira, as future successor to M. Bourguiba.

9174

CSO: 4400

REPORTAGE ON CHANGES IN ELECTORAL CODE

Paris LE MONDE in French 2 Aug 79 p 6

[Article by Michel Deure, LE MONDE correspondent]

[Text] Tunis--On Tuesday, 31 July, the National Assembly voted for an amendment to the electoral code whose principal provision states that during the next popular elections the number of candidates in each electoral district will be twice that of the number of seats to be filled.

Until now, the number of candidates had to be equal to the number of seats to be filled, and since the Destour Socialist Party was the only one to present lists, the majority of Tunisians considered every election simply a formality, and of no great interest.

Opposition groups, officially unrecognized, but tolerated, such as the Democratic Socialist Movement of Ahmed Mestiri, and the People's Unity Movement which claims kinship with the socialist policy of the former minister, Ben Salah, haven't yet decided whether they will participate in the November legislative elections, and the 1980 municipal elections, although it is possible. Even if the sole party is still without an opponent, future popular elections will now give voters a possible choice, however minimal.

This amendment "strengthens the democratic system followed by the country for more than 20 years, confirms the openness of the party, and reinforces the trend toward the presentation of lists containing candidates from among the Destour militants and others from among persons with good intentions," declared Prime Minister Hedi Nouira before the deputies.

However, when the lists of candidates are being drawn up, the new provisions which were the cause of closed discussions within the governing body before being presented to the assembly, are in danger of stirring up more or less serious oppositions between factions, which have already been expressed within the party.

On the other hand, the amendment introduces the registration on the electoral lists of Tunisian nationals living abroad (approximately 70,000 electors), which was not provided for under the former code. From now on, they will be able to vote if they are in Tunisia at the time of the elections.

9174

CSO: 4400

TUNISIA

MUP DISPUTES POINT MADE IN PREVIOUS ARTICLE

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Aug 79 p 3

[Text] In the wake of electoral reform taking place in Tunisia (LE MONDE 2 Aug) the People's Unity Movement inspired by Ben Salah, writes; "The MUP is far from being tolerated. On the contrary, our movement which was brutally represses in 1977 during the proceedings instituted against 33 of our comrades, is still deprived of all means of expression and organization. Although all of our comrades in Tunisia were the subject of a conditional release last November, most of them have not been able to return to work and are still submitted to all sorts of administrative harassments, while those who live in exile can never return to their country.

"Furthermore, the request made 1 year ago in good and due form by some of our comrades to publish a newspaper, AL OUAHDA, met with a categorical refusal on the part of responsible authorities in contempt of the country's constitution. (...) To say, under these conditions, that the MUP has an opportunity to participate in the next legislative elections in 1979 and in the municipal elections of 1980 is entirely unrelated to reality."

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